Supporting Documents:

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

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BETWEEN

Result: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal.

Reasons Given:

1. The notices lodged by the applicant and respondent are available on this website.

Jurisdiction

2. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is set out in the Constitution.

3. Article 34 of the Constitution provides for the public administration of justice; describes the courts established by the Constitution, and those which may be established by law; provides for the full and original jurisdiction of the High Court; establishes the Court of Appeal under Article 34.2; and sets out its appellate jurisdiction under Article 34.4.1°. This states:

“1º The Court of Appeal shall –

(i) Save as otherwise provided by this Article,

(ii) With such exceptions and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court, and also shall have appellate jurisdiction from such decisions of other courts as may be prescribed by law.”

5. Under Article 34.5.4˚ it is possible for a decision of the High Court to be directly appealed to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal. This type of appeal is sometimes referred to colloquially as a “leap-frog” appeal.

6. The Article relevant to this appeal is Article 34.5.3°, which states:

“The Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the Court of Appeal if the Supreme Court is satisfied that -

(i) the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or

(ii) in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court.”

8. Primarily, this Court is now “subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law”, an appellate jurisdiction from the Court of Appeal. Such an appeal may only be exercised provided that this Court is satisfied, either that the relevant decision of the Court of Appeal “involves a matter of general public importance”, or, alternatively, that it is “in the interests of justice”, necessary that there be an appeal to this Court. The constitutional framework established by the 33rd Amendment of the Constitution thus requires, in order for a party to be entitled to appeal to this Court from a decision of the Court of Appeal, that it be demonstrated that either “a matter of general public importance” arises, or that, “in the interests of justice, it is necessary that there be an appeal” to this Court.

9. The statutory framework for the exercise of the right to appeal to this Court for such leave is to be found in the Court of Appeal Act, 2014, and, in particular, the provisions of s.44 of that Act, which inserts a new s.7 into the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961.

10. The Rules of Court are set out in the amended Order 58 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

11. The Constitution has retained the entitlement of one appeal as a right from the High Court, subject to express exclusions or regulation by statute from the High Court to the Court of Appeal. What is sought here is a second appeal. The jurisdiction to bring an appeal to this Court is confined principally to cases where, as a result of the determination of the Court of Appeal, the decision of that court is such that the issues raised on a proposed appeal would involve a matter of general public importance, or would be such that it is in the interests of justice that there be a further appeal to this Court.

Applications for leave

12. These two applications appear to relate to one set of proceedings dealt with by the Court of Appeal on the 14th November, 2016. There are two Court of Appeal record numbers, and two separate orders, relating to two orders of Hanna J. in the High Court. Both have the same High Court record number. One refers to a judgment and order of Hanna J. made on the 17th September, 2014, determining that there had been no express agreement between the parties to settle the proceedings for €19,000. The other refers to an award to the plaintiff of €44,892.50 on the 26th June, 2015. There is no real difference between the two notices.

13. It is clear that the applicant is making a complaint about access to the DAR from the High Court prior to the appeal hearing; that he says that the plaintiff company did not properly prove its contract with him; and that he alleges that Ryan P. should not have sat for the appeal because he had some dealings with the case in the High Court. The respondent says, in relation to this latter complaint, that Ryan P. did not hear the High Court proceedings and, indeed, the court orders record that it was Hanna J.

14. Beyond that, it is impossible for this Court to work out what the case was about or why the applicant should have leave to appeal to this Court.

15. This is a case where the Court registrar wrote to the applicant in January 2017, pointing out that the papers lodged were inadequate and not in accordance with the rules.

Decision

16. The Court considers it desirable to point out that a determination of the Court on an application for leave, which is final and conclusive as far as the parties are concerned, is a decision in relation to that application only. The decision is whether the question, or questions, raised, and the facts underpinning them, meet the constitutional criteria for leave. Save in the rarest of circumstances, it will not be appropriate to rely upon a grant or refusal of leave as having a precedential value in relation to the substantive issues or in the context of different cases. Where leave is granted, any issue canvassed in the application will, in due course, be disposed of in the substantive decision of this Court.

17. In the circumstances the Court finds that the applicant has not made out grounds upon which it would be possible to say that the constitutional criteria have been met. Leave to appeal is therefore refused.

And it is hereby so ordered accordingly.