[1935]
1 I.R.	472	
ROBERT LYON MOORE AND OTHERS Appellants  v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE IRISH FREE STATE, WILLIAM GOAN AND OTHERS, Respondents (1)
Judicial Committee.	12, July 1934 
3,4,  Dec. 1934 
9,11 April 1935 
6 June 1935 
	
Jurisdiction of the Parliament of the Irish Free State - Limitation on legislationimposed by the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between GreatBritain and Ireland (hereinafter referred to as "The Treaty") - TheTreaty given the force of law by the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act,1922 (12 Geo. 5, c. 4) - Constitution of the Irish Free State - Enactedby the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922, Session 2 (13 Geo. 5, c. 1)- Inability of the Parliament of Irish Free State to pass laws repugnantto either of these statutes by reason of the Colonial Laws Validity Act,1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 63) - Statute of Westminster, 1931 (22 Geo. 5,c. 4) - Effect of - Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, not to apply to anylaw made by the Parliament of a Dominion - Consequent validity oflegislation of Parliament of Irish Free State which was repugnant to thelimitations imposed by the Treaty - Power of Parliament of Irish FreeState to abrogate the Treaty - Right of appeal from decisions of the SupremeCourt of Irish Free State to His Majesty in Council - Repealed by theConstitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933 (No. 45 of 1933) - Validity- Prerogative of the Crown - Pro tanto merged in the Statute of Westminster,1931 - Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act, 1933 (No. 6 of 1933) - Constitutionof the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922 (No. 1 of1922), Sch. I., Arts. 12, 50, 66; Sch. II., Arts. 1, 2, 17.
 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held:
 1. That, as the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland (hereinafter referred to as "The Treaty") were given the force of law by 12 Geo. 5, c. 4, and as the Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann ) Act, 1922, was scheduled to 13 Geo. 5, c. 1, both the Treaty and the Irish Free State Act formed parts of the statute law of the United Kingdom, each being part of an Imperial Act, and each derived their validity therefrom.
 2. That before the passing of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, it was not competent for the Parliament of the Irish Free State to pass an Act abrogating the Treaty because the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, forbade a Dominion Legislature to pass a law repugnant to an Imperial Act.
 3. That the effect of the Statute of Westminster was to remove the fetter on the Irish Free State Legislature imposed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and that Legislature could now pass Acts repugnant to an Imperial Act.
 4. That accordingly the Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act, 1933, which would otherwise be invalid because it removed from Art. 50 of the Constitution the condition that there could be no amendment of the Constitution unless it was within the terms of the Treaty, was valid by virtue of the Statute of Westminster.
 5. And that the Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933, was also valid by virtue of the same statute, though otherwise invalid because it was repugnant to Clause 2 of the Treaty, since it abolished the right to petition His Majesty in Council, that right being part of the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada, and that law, practice and constitutional usage was by clause 2 of the Treaty also to govern the relationship of the Crown or representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Irish Free State.
Performing Right Society v. Bray Urban District Council ,  [1930] A. C. 377 ;  [1930] I. R. 508 , followed.

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
	473
Judicial Committee.	

 6. And that the said amendment effected by the Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933, abolishing the right to petition His Majesty in Council, was not invalid on the ground that it affected the King's prerogative in a matter outside the Dominion and outside the competence of the Parliament of the Irish Free State, because the King's prerogative in this respect and in this particular statute (i.e., the Statute of Westminster) was made matter of Parliamentary legislation so that it was pro tanto merged in the Statute, and the Statute gave powers of amending and altering the statutory prerogative.

Petition to have it declared that an amendment to the Constitution of the Irish Free State, enacted by the Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933 (No. 45 of 1933) (1), was no bar to the maintenance by the petitioners of their appeal before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
 The petitioners had obtained special leave to appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of the Irish Free State under the proviso to Art. 66 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State, in the action brought by them against the Attorney-General of the Irish Free State and others, claiming a declaration that they were entitled to a several fishery in the entire tidal portion of the River Erne, in the County of Donegal. The decision of the Supreme Court is reported [1934] I. R. 44. Art. 66 of the Constitution is as follows:—
 "The Supreme Court of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann ) shall, with such exceptions (not including cases which involve questions as to the validity of any law) and 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
	474
Judicial Committee.	
 subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court. The decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive, and shall not be reviewed or capable of being reviewed by any other Court, tribunal, or authority whatsoever:
 "Provided that nothing in this Constitution shall impair the right of any person to petition His Majesty for special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council or the right of His Majesty to grant such leave."
 Counsel for the petitioners informed the Judicial Committee on July 12th, 1934, when the appeal came before the Judicial Committee for hearing, that for the moment they were unable to proceed with their appeal, because they had been unable to get the record of the proceedings in the Supreme Court of the Irish Free State. It was necessary to file that record with the Registrar of the Privy Council before the appeal could be set in motion. And on the 16th November, 1933, the Parliament of the Irish Free State had passed the Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933 (1), providing that no appeal should lie from a decision of the Supreme Court of the Irish Free State to His Majesty in Council, and that it should not be lawful for any person, after the passing of that Act, to proceed with an appeal from any judgment or order of that Court. That on the 24th November, 1933, the Order in Council giving the petitioners special leave to appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court had been lodged with the Registrar of that Court, but the Registrar had returned the Order in Council to the petitioners' solicitors, with an endorsement upon it to the effect that, having regard to the recent legislation amending Article 66 of the Constitution, he could not receive, or act on, this Order, without a direction of the Supreme Court which gave the decision appealed from.
 After some correspondence with the Registrar of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, counsel stated the Registrar of the Irish Free State Supreme Court refused to transmit the record of the proceedings in that Court to the Privy Council. In these circumstances, the petitioners asked that they should not be precluded from proceeding with their appeal, but might have leave to deliver to the Registrar of the Privy Council the necessary documents, and that such documents should be treated as the record required to be lodged.

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
	475
Judicial Committee.	

 Counsel therefore suggested that, as a preliminary, the Judicial Committee should decide as to the validity of the Act passed by the Parliament of the Irish Free State, so far as it related to the appeal. He submitted that it was desirable, for the reasons he had indicated, that that matter should first be dealt with as a preliminary issue. If that should be decided against the petitioners, it would end the matter, and the great expense of preparing the record would be saved. On the other hand, if it was decided in their favour, the appeal could proceed in the ordinary way. He thought that the constitutional issue would have to be decided in any event, and the most convenient course would be to discuss and decide it as a preliminary matter.
 The Lord Chancellor said that they could not make any order to the effect desired by counsel, but they could advise His Majesty that the course suggested would be the most convenient one to take.
 Counsel said that there was also the possibility, when the matter came before their Lordships on the preliminary issue, that they would not have the assistance of the Attorney-General of the Irish Free State or of counsel for the fishermen respondents. In these circumstances, great responsibility would be placed upon counsel for the appellants. Perhaps their Lordships would take the view that the Attorney-General of England might be notified in order that they might have his assistance.
 Lord Atkin suggested that it might be desirable to notify the Secretary for the Dominions.
 After a private consultation by their Lordships, the Lord Chancellor announced that they would advise His Majesty to give directions that the petition be postponed, except that it be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to determine the preliminary question as to the validity of the Irish Free State Act, in so far as it affected the appeal of the petitioners, and that the hearing of this preliminary issue be fixed for October 16th following.
 The hearing of this preliminary issue was not proceeded with on October 16th but it was proceeded with on December 3rd and 4th, and on the latter day the hearing was adjourned pending the hearing of an appeal from Canada, in which the right of appeal to the Privy Council and the effect of the Statute of Westminster also arose ( British Coal Corporation and Others v. The King , the judgment of the Judicial Committee in which is reported post p. 487). The arguments were resumed on April 9th and were concluded on April 11th, 1935.

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
	476
Judicial Committee.	

Wilfrid Greene K.C. , G. R. B. White  (both of the English Bar) and Arthur C. Newitt  for the appellants.
 The Attorney-General of the Irish Free State and the other respondents did not appear and were not represented.
 The Attorney-General of England (Sir Thomas InskipK.C. ) and Wilfrid Lewis  (of the English Bar) were present to assist the Board.
Cur. adv. vult.
 The following is a copy of the printed judgment of the Judicial Committee, delivered by Viscount Sankey L.C.

Viscount Sankey L.C. :—
	6, June 1935 

 This is a petition to have it declared that an amendment to the Constitution of the Irish Free State, viz., Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933, is no bar to the maintenance by the petitioners, who are the appellants, of their appeal before this Board. The petitioners claim to be owners of a fishery in the tidal waters of the River Erne in Ireland. They had brought an action in the Irish Courts to enforce their claim and had succeeded before the trial Judge (1). On appeal to the Supreme Court that judgment was reversed on the 31st July, 1933, by a majority (2). The petitioners then presented to the Privy Council their petition for special leave to appeal, the grant of which leave was, on the 9th October, 1933, advised by this Board, and on the 10th November, 1933, an order granting such leave was made by the King in Council. But on the 16th November, 1933, an Act was passed by the Oireachtas of Saorstát Éireann , the Parliament of the Irish Free State, hereinafter called "the Oireachtas," providing that no appeal should lie to His Majesty in Council from any Court in the Irish Free State: this enactment was also expressed to apply to appeals then pending. The petitioners thereupon brought this petition praying to have it declared that the enactment was void and did not bar their appeal.
 The Attorney-General of the Irish Free State and the other respondents did not appear before this Board; the Attorney-General of England did, however, appear and gave the Board his assistance on the law relevant to the questions at issue.
 For the decision of these questions it is necessary to 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	477
Judicial Committee.	
 consider the mode in which the Constitution of the Irish Free State was established.
 On the 6th December, 1921, there were signed in London"Articles of an Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland": this instrument will hereinafter be referred to as "the Treaty": it was signed by representatives of Great Britain on the one hand and of the Irish Free State (or what became the Irish Free State) on the other. On the 31st March, 1922, an Act of the Imperial Parliament was passed (1). It was entitled the"Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922," and by sect. 1, sub-sect. 1, it provided that as from the date of that Act the Treaty, which was scheduled to it, should have the force of law. It also provided by sect. 1, sub-sect. 2, that there should be elected certain members of a body to be called the "House of the Parliament" to which the Provisional Government should be responsible and which should have power, as respects matters within the jurisdiction of that Government, to make laws in like manner as the Parliament of the Irish Free State when constituted. The latter provision was expressed to be in order to give effect to Article 17 of the Treaty, which was in the following terms:
 "By way of provisional arrangement for the administration of Southern Ireland during the interval which must elapse between the date hereof and the constitution of a Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State in accordance therewith, steps shall be taken forthwith for summoning a meeting of members of Parliament elected for constituencies in Southern Ireland since the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and for constituting a provisional Government, and the British Government shall take the steps necessary to transfer to such provisional Government the powers and machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties, provided that every member of such provisional Government shall have signified in writing his or her acceptance of this instrument. But this arrangement shall not continue in force beyond the expiration of twelve months from the date hereof."
 This Act gave no power to "the House of the Parliament"to enact a Constitution for the Irish Free State.
 In due course "the House of the Parliament," which was a single chamber body, was elected and met on 9th September, 1922; it proceeded to sit as a constituent assembly for the settlement of the Constitution of the Irish 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	478
Judicial Committee.	
 Free State. The measure which it so passed was scheduled to an Act of the Imperial Parliament entitled the "Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922, Session 2," which received the Royal Assent on the 5th December, 1922 (1), and which described the measure as the "Constituent Act" and by sect. 1 provided as follows:
 "The Constitution set forth in the First Schedule to the Constituent Act shall, subject to the provisions to which the same is by the Constituent Act so made subject as aforesaid, be the Constitution of the Irish Free State, and shall come into operation on the same being proclaimed by His Majesty in accordance with Article eighty-three of the said Constitution, but His Majesty may at any time after the proclamation appoint a Governor-General for the Irish Free State."
 The provisions to which the Constitution was made subject by the Constituent Act were recited in the Act and were as follows:
 "The said Constitution shall be construed with reference to the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland set forth in the Second Schedule hereto annexed (hereinafter referred to as the 'Scheduled Treaty') which are hereby given the force of law, and if any provision of the said Constitution or of any amendment thereof or of any law made thereunder is in any respect repugnant to any of the provisions of the Scheduled Treaty, it shall, to the extent only of such repugnancy, be absolutely void and inoperative and the Parliament and the Executive Council of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann ) shall respectively pass such further legislation and do all such other things as may be necessary to implement the Scheduled Treaty."
 Sects. 4 and 5 of the Act were in the following terms:
 "4. Nothing in the said Constitution shall be construed as prejudicing the power of Parliament to make laws affecting the Irish Free State in any case where, in accordance with constitutional practice, Parliament would make laws affecting other self-governing Dominions.
 5. This Act may be cited as the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922 (Session 2), and shall be deemed to be the Act of Parliament for the ratification of the said Articles of Agreement as from the passing whereof 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	479
Judicial Committee.	
 the month mentioned in Article eleven of the said Articles is to run."
 Thus the Treaty received the force of law, both in the United Kingdom and in Ireland by reason of the passing of an Act of the Imperial Parliament; and the Constituent Act owed its validity to the same authority.
 Before referring to the material clauses of the Constitution, it will be convenient to quote clauses 1 and 2 of the Treaty which were as follows:
 "1. Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State.
 2. Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or the representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State."
 The construction and effect of clause 2 were considered by the Judicial Committee in  Performing Right Society v.Bray Urban District Council (1): it was there held that the words of that clause specifically ensured the right to petition His Majesty in Council, because that right was part of the law, practice and constitutional usage then governing the relationship of the Crown or representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada. Their Lordships in the present case follow that decision.
 Of the Articles of the Constitution the following are so material in this matter that they should be set out here in full:
 "Article 12.—A Legislature is hereby created to be known as the Oireachtas. It shall consist of the King and two Houses, the Chamber of Deputies (otherwise called and herein generally referred to as 'Dáil Éireann' ) 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	480
Judicial Committee.	
 and the Senate (otherwise called and herein generally referred to as 'Seanad Éireann' ). The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the peace, order and good government of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann )is vested in the Oireachtas.
Article 50.—Amendments of this Constitution within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty may be made by the Oireachtas, but no such amendment, passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, after the expiration of a period of eight years from the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, shall become law, unless the same shall, after it has been passed or deemed to have been passed by the said two Houses of the Oireachtas, have been submitted to a Referendum of the people, and unless a majority of the voters on the register shall have recorded their votes on such Referendum, and either the votes of a majority of the voters on the register, or two-thirds of the votes recorded, shall have been cast in favour of such amendment. Any such amendment may be made within the said period of eight years by way of ordinary legislation and as such shall be subject to the provisions of Article 47 hereof.
Article 66.—The Supreme Court of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann ) shall, with such exceptions (not including cases which involve questions as to the validity of any law) and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court. The decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive, and shall not be reviewed or capable of being reviewed by any other Court, Tribunal or Authority whatsoever:
 Provided that nothing in this Constitution shall impair the right of any person to petition His Majesty for special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council or the right of His Majesty to grant such leave."
 It seems that the proviso to Article 66 of the Constitution was inserted to give effect in that particular regard to Article 2 of the Treaty, and hence under Article 50 of the Constitution that proviso could not be amended in the way in which it is sought to amend it by abolishing the right of appeal because such an amendment would not be within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty.
 On the 6th December, 1922, there was issued a Proclamation of His Majesty announcing the passing and adoption of the Constitution, and thereafter the House of Parliament

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	481
Judicial Committee.	
 or Constituent Assembly or Provisional Parliament was in due course dissolved and a Parliament called the Oireachtas for the Irish Free State was elected in due course.
 On the 14th May, 1929, the Oireachtas passed an Act (the Constitution (Amendment No. 16) Act, 1929) which substituted for the eight years specified in Article 50 as being the period during which amendment might be made without a referendum, a period of 16 years. All the subsequent amendments which are referred to in this judgment were made without a referendum, in accordance with this amendment. Mr. Wilfrid Greene for the petitioners rightly conceded that Amendment No. 16 was regular and that the validity of these subsequent amendments could not be attacked on the ground that they had not been submitted to the people by referendum.
 On the 11th December, 1931, the Statute of Westminster, hereinafter called "the Statute," was enacted (1). It was the result of the proceedings at the Imperial Conference, 1930, in which representatives of the Irish Free State took part together with the delegates of the other Dominions; that fact is recorded in the first recital, and in the last recital it is recorded that the Irish Free State, with the other 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	482
Judicial Committee.	
 Dominions, had requested and consented to the submission of the measure to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Sect. 1 includes in the expression "Dominion" (with the other Dominions) the Irish Free State. Of the other sections that which is most relevant in these proceedings is sect. 2, which is in the following terms:
 "2.—(1) The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, shall not apply to any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion.
 (2) No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of the Dominion."
 Sects. 3 and 4 also refer to the Irish Free State as being a Dominion within the meaning of the Statute.

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	483
Judicial Committee.	

 On the 3rd May, 1933, the Oireachtas passed an Act, No. 6 of 1933, entitled the "Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act, 1933"; that Act by sect. 2 provided that sect. 2 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann ) Act, 1922, should be repealed, and, by sect. 3, that Article 50 of the Constitution should be amended by deleting the words "within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty."
 Finally, on the 16th November, 1933, the Oireachtas, as already stated, enacted the Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act, 1933, amending Article 66 of the Constitution so as to terminate the right of appeal to His Majesty in Council.
 It is clear that, if this last mentioned amending Act is valid, the petition must fail because the amendment of the Constitution embodied in that Act must bar the right of appeal to the King in Council, if it is effective. But it cannot be effective unless the earlier Act (No. 6 of 1933) is also valid, viz. that which is directed to removing from Article 50 the condition that there can be no amendment of the Constitution unless it is within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty. On the construction of Article 2 of the Treaty, which has been adopted above, Article 50, while it stands 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	484
Judicial Committee.	
 unamended, must prevent any amendment of the Constitution which would impair that right of appeal, that is, any amendment whereby the right of appeal to the King in Council is to be impaired. Hence it must be determined whether that Act of the Oireachtas, No. 6 of 1933, was validly enacted.
 Mr. Greene for the petitioners has contended that this last mentioned Act was not valid. His argument was that the Constitution derived its existence not from any legislation of the Imperial Parliament but solely from the operations of an Irish body, the Constituent Assembly, which is called in Ireland the Third Dáil Éireann:  this body, it is said, though mentioned in the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, was in fact elected pursuant to a resolution passed on the 20th May, 1922, by the Second Dáil Éireann , an Irish legislative assembly. The Third Dáil Éireann  was thus, it was alleged, set up in Ireland by election of the people of Ireland of their own authority as a Constituent Assembly to create a Constitution, and, having accomplished its work, went out of existence, leaving no successor and no body in authority capable of amending the Constituent Act. The result of that argument is that a Constitution was established which Mr. Greene has described as a semi-rigid Constitution, 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	485
Judicial Committee.	
 that is, one capable of being amended in detail in the different Articles according to their terms, but not susceptible of any alteration so far as concerns the Constituent Act, unless perhaps by the calling together of a new constituent assembly by the people of Ireland. Thus the Articles of the Constitution may only be amended in accordance with Article 50, which limits amendments to such as are within the terms of the scheduled Treaty. On that view Mr. Greene argues that the law No. 6 of 1933 is ultra vires and hence that the amendment No. 22 of 1933 falls with it. It follows from that argument, if accepted, that the right of appeal to the King in Council is preserved unimpaired. In support of his argument that the Constituent Act and the Constitution are subject only to what is called Irish law and outside the authority of the Imperial Parliament, either in inception or in possibility of alteration save as provided therein, Mr. Greene referred their Lordships to an unreported case in the Supreme Court of the Irish Free State,  The State (Ryan and Others) v. Lennon and Others , the judgment in which was delivered on the 19th December, 1934 (1). In that case Kennedy C.J. is reported to have expressed a view which corresponds in substance to that contended for by Mr. Greene. But their Lordships cannot accept these contentions. In their opinion the Constituent Act and the Constitution of the Irish Free State derived their validity from the Act of the Imperial Parliament, the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922. This Act established that the Constitution, subject to the provisions of the Constituent Act, should be the Constitution of the Irish Free State and should come into operation upon being proclaimed by His Majesty, as was done on the 6th December, 1922. The action of the House of Parliament was thereby ratified; apart from such ratification that body had no authority to make a Constitution; all the authority it originally possessed was derived from the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, sect. 1, sub-sect. 1 and sub-sect. 2 of which have been referred to above; those sub-sections only gave the House of Parliament jurisdiction to make laws in respect of matters within the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government. It has been pointed out in the foregoing that in the Statute the Irish Free State was treated as one of the Dominions, the delegates of which took part in the Imperial Conference of 1930. The Irish Free State is in their Lordships' judgment bound by the Acts of the Imperial Parliament in the same way as any other of the Dominions; if it were not 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	486
Judicial Committee.	
 for sect. 2 of the Statute the Oireachtas would have had no power to amend or repeal an Act of the Imperial Parliament and has now such power only so far as any such Act is part of the law of the Dominion in virtue of sect. 2 of the Statute. Hence the Act No. 6 of 1933 and the Amendment No. 22 of 1933, and certain other Acts of the Oireachtas not here material which contain amendments of the Articles which are not within the terms of the Treaty, are only valid Acts of the Oireachtas in virtue of the Statute. For the Statute alone gives to the Oireachtas power to repeal or amend the Constituent Act, which has the force of an Imperial enactment by reason that it is embodied in the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922. Mr. Greene has contended that these amendments cannot be deemed to be valid under the Statute because the Oireachtas in enacting these Acts was not purporting to proceed under the Statute, but was assuming to proceed solely under Irish law. But as what the Oireachtas was doing was in truth, as already stated, the repealing or amending of parts of an Imperial statute, viz., the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922, what the Oireachtas did must, in their Lordships' judgment, be deemed to have been done in the way in which alone it could legally be done, that is by virtue of the powers given by the Statute. It follows that by virtue of the Statute, Article 66 of the Constitution has been validly amended with the result that the proviso to that Article is removed and appeals to the King in Council are now prohibited.
 The position may be summed up as follows:—
 (1) The Treaty and the Constituent Act respectively form parts of the statute law of the United Kingdom, each of them being parts of an Imperial Act.
 (2) Before the passing of the Statute of Westminster it was not competent for the Irish Free State Parliament to pass an Act abrogating the Treaty because the Colonial Laws Validity Act forbade a Dominion Legislature to pass a law repugnant to an Imperial Act.
 (3) The effect of the Statute of Westminster was to remove the fetter which lay upon the Irish Free State Legislature by reason of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. That Legislature can now pass Acts repugnant to an Imperial Act. In this case they have done so.
 It would be out of place to criticise the legislation enacted by the Irish Free State Legislature. But the Board desire to add that they are expressing no opinion upon any contractual obligation under which, regard being had to the terms of the Treaty, the Irish Free State lay. The simplest

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	487
Judicial Committee.	
 way of stating the situation is to say that the Statute of Westminster gave to the Irish Free State a power under which they could abrogate the Treaty, and that, as a matter of law, they have availed themselves of that power.
 Mr. Greene has finally contended that the amendment is invalid because it affects the prerogative of the King in a matter outside the Dominion and outside the competence of the Oireachtas. It might be possible to state many objections to this contention, but it is enough here to say that whatever might be the position of the King's prerogative if it were left as matter of the common law, it is here in this particular respect and in this particular enactment made matter of Parliamentary legislation, so that the prerogative is pro tanto merged in the Statute, and the Statute gives powers of amending and altering the statutory prerogative. This objection also fails.
 In the result their Lordships are of opinion that the petition should fail and be dismissed.
 They will humbly so advise His Majesty.
 Solicitors for the petitioners: Mackrell, Maton, Godlee and Quincey.
 Solicitor for the Attorney-General of England: The Treasury Solicitor.
s.v.k.

 The printed judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Canadian appeal,  British Coal Corporation and Others v. The King , for which the arguments in  Moore and Others v.Attorney-General of the Irish Free State and Others  were adjourned, as already stated, was as set out below. The British Coal Corporation and Others petitioned for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Court of King's Bench (Appeal Side) of the Province of Quebec, as stated in the judgment of the Judicial Committee, where the further material facts are also stated. The same members of the Judicial Committee were present as at the hearing of the Irish petition and the judgment was delivered on the same day (June 6th, 1935) immediately after the judgment in the Irish petition.
 The judgment of the Judicial Committee was delivered by Viscount Sankey L.C.

Viscount Sankey L.C. :—
 This is a petition for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Court of King's Bench (Appeal Side) of the Province of Quebec, delivered on the 5th October, 1934. The petitioners had been convicted on the 12th December,

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	488
Judicial Committee.	
 1933, under sect. 498 of the Canadian Criminal Code and under sects. 2 and 32 of the Combines Investigation Act, 1923, before the Court of King's Bench (Crown Side) and had been subjected to fines totalling $30,000, but the more serious effect to the petitioners of the conviction was that their business operations in the import of British anthracite coal were held to be illegal. The conviction was upheld by the judgment of the Appeal Court.
 Before their Lordships proceeded to consider questions appertaining to the merits of the petition, they decided in the first instance to determine a preliminary objection, which was that the petition was incompetent by reason of the provisions of sect. 17 of the Canadian Statute 23 and 24 Geo. 5, c. 53 (an Act to amend the Criminal Code) which was in the following terms: "sub-section 4 of section 10 of the said Act (the Criminal Code) is repealed and is hereby re-enacted as follows:—
 (4) Notwithstanding any royal prerogative or anything contained in the Interpretation Act or in the Supreme Court Act, no appeal shall be brought in any criminal case from any judgment or order of any Court in Canada to any Court of Appeal or authority in which in the United Kingdom appeals or petitions to His Majesty may be heard."
 It is clear that if this enactment is valid, the petition is barred. It is, however, contended on behalf of the petitioners that the section is invalid. A section in identical terms had been held invalid by the Judicial Committee in  Nadanv. The King (1), and that decision was founded upon in these proceedings by the petitioners, who contended on various grounds that the enactment of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, had not affected the position which the decision just cited had established. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (which will be referred to here as the Statute), had removed certain fetters which according to that decision had till then affected the legislative competence of Canada in the relevant respects, and that, these fetters being removed, the provisions of the British North America Act of 1867 had full effect to invest the Parliament of Canada with power to enact the section in question.
 It will be convenient to summarise in the briefest terms the nature of the appeal from Dominion or Colonial Courts to His Majesty in Council. The position of this Board, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in relation to 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	489
Judicial Committee.	
 such appeals may first be indicated. The Judicial Committee is a statutory body established in 1833 by an Act of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c, 41, entitled an Act for the better Administration of Justice in His Majesty's Privy Council. It contains (inter alia) the following recital: "And whereas from decisions of various Courts of Judicature in the East Indies and the plantations and other colonies and dominions of His Majesty abroad, an appeal lies to His Majesty in Council."The Act then provides for the formation of a Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council, to be styled the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and enacts that "all appeals or complaints in the nature of appeals whatever, which either by virtue of this Act or of any law, statute or custom may be brought before His Majesty in Council" from the order of any Court or Judge should thereafter be referred by His Majesty to, and heard by, the Judicial Committee, as established by the Act, who should make a report or recommendation to His Majesty in Council for his decision thereon, the nature of such report or recommendation being always stated in open Court. The Act contained a great number of provisions for the conduct of appeals. It is clear that the Committee is regarded in the Act as a judicial body or Court, though all it can do is to report or recommend to His Majesty in Council, by whom alone the Order in Council which is made to give effect to the report of the Committee is made.
 But according to constitutional convention it is unknown and unthinkable that His Majesty in Council should not give effect to the report of the Judicial Committee, who are thus in truth an appellate Court of law, to which by the Statute of 1833 all appeals within their purview are referred.
 A later Act, the Judicial Committee Act, 1844, must next be mentioned. Apart from certain changes in procedure, the main effect of that Act was to authorise Her Majesty to provide, by Order or Orders in Council made for that purpose, for the admission of any appeals to Her Majesty in Council from judgments or orders of any Court of Justice within any British Colony or possession abroad even though such Court might not be a Court of Error: this followed a recital that by the laws in force in certain of Her Majesty's Colonies no appeal could be brought save only from Courts of Error or of Appeal and that it was expedient to provide that Her Majesty in Council should be authorised to admit such appeals. In effect, therefore, Her Majesty in Council was thus empowered to override a Colonial law limiting or excluding appeals to Her Majesty in Council from any Colonial Court.
 In this way the functions of the Judicial Committee as a court of law were established. The practice had grown up

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	490
Judicial Committee.	
 that the colonies under the authority either of Orders in Council or of Acts of Parliament should provide for appeals as of right from their courts to the King in Council and should fix the conditions on which such appeals should be permitted. But outside these limits there had always been reserved a discretion to the King in Council to grant special leave to appeal from a colonial court irrespective of the limitations fixed by the colonial law: this discretion to grant special leave to appeal was in practice described as the prerogative right: it was indeed a residuum of the Royal Prerogative of the Sovereign as the fountain of justice. In early days it was to the King that any subject who had failed to get justice in the King's Court brought his petition for redress. As time went on, such petitions were brought to the King in Parliament (which was the origin of the modern judicial functions of the House of Lords) or to the King in his Chancery (from which flowed the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery). But this was so only in causes which had been dealt with in English Courts: from the Courts of the Channel Islands and later from the Courts of the Plantations or Colonies the petition went to the King in Council, and this continued to be the practice after the jurisdiction of the Privy Council in English common law cases had been abolished. It was this appellate jurisdiction (along with other jurisdictions such as in Admiralty or Ecclesiastical Causes) which was affirmed and regulated by Parliament in the Privy Council Acts of 1833 and 1844. Although in form the appeal was still to the King in Council, it was so in form only and became in truth an appeal to the Judicial Committee which as such exercised as a Court of Law in reality though not in name, the residual prerogative of the King in Council. No doubt it was the order of the King in Council which gave effect to their reports but that order was in no sense other than in form either the King's personal order or the order of the general body of the Privy Council.
 In 1865 the Colonial Laws Validity Act was passed. It was described as an Act to remove doubts as to the validity of Colonial Laws: for this context it is enough to say that it was an Act which declared that a colonial law should be deemed to be and to have been void to the extent that it was repugnant to any Act of the Imperial Parliament extending to the colony or any order or regulation made under such Act.
 In 1867 the British North America Act (hereinafter called the Act) was passed. It was an Act to provide for the establishment in Canada of one Dominion and for the Legislative Authority in the Dominion and to declare the nature of the executive government therein. It was declared that the executive government of and over Canada should be vested

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	491
Judicial Committee.	
 in the Queen, and that there should be a Council (the Queen's Privy Council in Canada) to aid and advise in the government of Canada. The legislative power was vested in the Parliament for Canada, which by sect. 91 was to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects assigned by sect. 92 exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces: without restricting the generality of that provision, certain matters were specifically enumerated as falling within the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada: of these it is sufficient here to mention No. 27, which was"The Criminal Law, except the constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the procedure in criminal matters." On the other hand, among the matters assigned by sect. 92 exclusively to the provincial authority there fell No. 14, "The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the constitution, maintenance and organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, and including procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts."By sect. 101 of the Act it was provided "The Parliament of Canada may notwithstanding anything in this Act, from time to time, provide for the constitution, maintenance and organization of a general Court of Appeal for Canada and for the establishment of any additional Courts for the better administration of the laws of Canada." Under the last mentioned section the Parliament of Canada by an Act of 1875 established (along with the Exchequer Court) "The Supreme Court of Canada" which was to exercise an appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction within and throughout the Dominion of Canada: it was provided by sect. 47 that "the judgment of the Supreme Court should be in all cases final and conclusive . . . Saving any right which Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal Prerogative."
 In 1880 in the case of  Cushing v. Dupuy (1), which was an appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench for Quebec, the Judicial Committee had to consider the effect of a Dominion Act dealing with insolvency, which contained a clause providing that "the judgment of the Court to which under this section the appeal can be made shall be final." That Court in the case in question was the Court of Queen's Bench for Quebec. The Judicial Committee decided that as the Act in question "contains no words which purport to derogate from the prerogative of the Queen to allow as an act of grace appeals from the Court of Queen's Bench in matters of insolvency, her authority in that respect is unaffected by it." But they added that they did not consider it necessary 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	492
Judicial Committee.	
 "to consider what powers may be possessed by the Parliament of Canada to interfere with the royal prerogative."
 In 1888 a section identical in terms with the section now in question was enacted as sect. 1025 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Between that year and 1926 appeals came before the Board in which the question of the validity of that section might have been raised but was not or, if it was raised, was not the subject of decision. To take one instance, in  Attorney-General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers (1), the Judicial Committee said that their order"involved no decision as to the power of the Parliament of Canada to enact sect. 1025 of the Criminal Code."
 But in 1926 in the case of  Nadan v. The King (2) a decision was for the first time given on the question whether the section was valid. It was held that the section wasultra vires and invalid. It is essential, however, to determine the ratio decidendi on which this judgment was based. Theratio decidendi is, in their Lordships' opinion, to be found in a comparatively short passage which follows a citation of the Privy Council Acts of 1833 and 1844, and which is of so vital an import that it must be here quoted in full (pp. 492, 493):
 "Under what authority, then, can a right so established and confirmed be abrogated by the Parliament of Canada? The British North America Act, by section 91, empowered the Dominion Parliament to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada in relation to matters not coming within the classes of subjects by that Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and in particular it gave to the Canadian Parliament exclusive legislative authority in respect of 'the criminal law, except the constitution of Courts of criminal jurisdiction, but including the procedure in criminal matters.' But however widely these powers are construed they are confined to action to be taken in the Dominion; and they do not appear to their Lordships to authorise the Dominion Parliament to annul the prerogative right of the King in Council to grant special leave to appeal. Further, by section 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, it is enacted that 'any colonial law which is or shall be in any respect repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament extending to the Colony to which such law may relate, or repugnant to any order or regulation made under the authority of such Act of Parliament or having in the Colony the force and effect of such Act, shall be read 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	493
Judicial Committee.	
 subject to such Act, order or regulation, and shall to the extent of such repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and inoperative.' In their Lordships' opinion section 1025 of the Canadian Criminal Code, if and so far as it is intended to prevent the Sovereign in Council from giving effective leave to appeal against an order of a Canadian Court, is repugnant to the Acts of 1833 and 1844 which have been cited, and is therefore void and inoperative by virtue of the Act of 1865. It is true that the Code has received the royal assent, but that assent cannot give validity to an enactment which is void by Imperial statute. If the prerogative is to be excluded, this must be accomplished by an Imperial statute; and in fact the modifications which were deemed necessary in respect of Australia and South Africa were effected in that way: see Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900, section 74, and Union of South Africa Act, 1909, section 106."
 The judgment then goes on to review a number of authorities and thus concludes (p. 495): "Upon a review of these authorities it appears to their Lordships that they contain nothing inconsistent with the conclusion which their Lordships have reached upon principle and that, so far as they go, they support that conclusion."
 On a careful consideration of the judgment of the Board in  Nadan's Case (1), their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment was based on two grounds only: (1) that sect. 1025 was repugnant to the Privy Council Acts of 1933 and 1844 and was therefore void under the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865; (2) that it could only be effective if construed as having an extra-territorial operation, whereas according to the law as it was in 1926 a Dominion Statute could not have extra-territorial operation. These two difficulties as the law then stood could only be overcome by an Imperial Statute: the Australian and South African Acts were cited as illustrations of Imperial Statutes containing clauses apt to define or limit this prerogative. Such, their Lordships think, is the meaning of the decision in  Nadan's Case (1): they do not find in it any clear or precise determination of what, if these two fundamental difficulties had been removed, would have been held to have been the true effect of the Act, nor can their Lordships say how, apart from these objections, the Judicial Committee would have decided the issue whether or not the Act had given the Canadian Legislature power to enact sect. 1025.

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	494
Judicial Committee.	

 Their Lordships have now to decide that very same question and to decide it, as they conceive, without any direct help or guidance from earlier decisions of the Judicial Committee, now that the Statute has removed the two difficulties which were decisive in  Nadan's Case (1). The relevant clauses of the Statute which have this effect are as follows:
 "2.—(1) The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, shall not apply to any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion."
 "(2) No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of the Dominion.
 3. It is hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion has full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation.
 7.—(1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or any order, rule or regulation made thereunder.
 (2) The provisions of section 2 of this Act shall extend to the laws made by any of the Provinces of Canada and to the powers of the legislatures of such Provinces.
 (3) The powers conferred by this Act upon the Parliament of Canada or upon the legislatures of the Provinces shall be restricted to the enactment of laws in relation to matters within the competence of the Parliament of Canada or of any of the legislatures of the Provinces respectively."
 What is the extent of the legislative competence in the relevant regard conferred on the Canadian Parliament, putting out of question the limitations which are now removed, must be ascertained from the words of the Constituent Act. In construing the words of that Act, it must be remembered what the nature and scope of the Act are. They are indicated in the words used by Lord Loreburn L.C. in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada (2).

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	495
Judicial Committee.	

 "In 1867 the desire of Canada for a definite Constitution embracing the entire Dominion was embodied in the British North America Act. Now, there can be no doubt that under this organic instrument the powers distributed between the Dominion on the one hand and the Provinces on the other hand cover the whole area of self-government within the whole area of Canada. It would be subversive of the entire scheme and policy of the Act to assume that any point of internal self-government was withheld from Canada."
 The same principle was recognised in the following language used in  Hodge v. The Queen (1) in respect of the powers of Provincial Legislatures:
 "When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a Legislature for Ontario, and that its legislative assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow. Within these limits of subjects and area the local Legislature is supreme, and has the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have had under like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make by-laws or resolutions as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect."
 The same language can properly be used in regard to the Dominion Parliament, to which indeed the passage just quoted was applied in  Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain , (2). That was a case in which it was held that the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government were wide enough to enable the Dominion Parliament to pass a statute vesting in the Dominion Executive the prerogative power to expel and deport aliens. Indeed, in interpreting a constituent or organic statute such as the Act, that construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted. This principle has been again clearly laid down by the Judicial Committee in  Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada , (3):

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	496
Judicial Committee.	

 "Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board—it is certainly not their desire—to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation so that the Dominion to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, may be mistress in her own house, as the Provinces to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, are mistresses in theirs. 'The Privy Council, indeed, has laid down that Courts of Law must treat the provisions of the British North America Act by the same methods of construction and exposition which they apply to other statutes. But there are statutes and statutes; and the strict construction deemed proper in the case, for example, of a penal or taxing statute or one passed to regulate the affairs of an English parish, would be often subversive of Parliament's real intent if applied to an Act passed to ensure the peace, order and good government of a British Colony': see Clement's Canadian Constitution, 3rd ed., p. 347."
 No doubt the principle is clearly established that the King's prerogative cannot be restricted or qualified save by express words or by necessary intendment. In connection with Dominion or Colonial matters that principle involves that if the limitation of the prerogative is by a Dominion or Colonial Act, not only must that Act itself deal with the prerogative either by express terms, or by necessary intendment, but it must be the Act of a Dominion or Colonial Legislature which has been endowed with the requisite power by an Imperial Act likewise giving the power either by express terms or by necessary intendment. In the matter now in question it is beyond question that section 17 of the Canadian Act is expressed in precise terms. The next question is whether section 91 of the Act invests the Dominion Parliament, in cases within its jurisdiction, with the power to regulate or prohibit the appeal to the King in Council. Their Lordships are of opinion that the Act does invest the Dominion Parliament with these powers. It does not indeed do so by express terms, but it does so by necessary intendment. Section 91 of the Act, read along with the rest of the Act, is, according to its true construction in their Lordships' opinion, apart from the limitations already referred to, intended to make, and is apt to make, the Dominion Legislature supreme and endow it with the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, within the assigned limits of subject and area, just as it was said in  Hodge v. The Queen , (1) that section 92 of the Act had that effect in regard to 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	497
Judicial Committee.	
 the Provincial Legislatures. It is true that before the Statute, the Dominion Legislature was subject to the limitations imposed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act and by section 129 of the Act, and also by the principle or rule that its powers were limited by the doctrine forbidding extra-territorial legislation, though that is a doctrine of somewhat obscure extent. But these limitations have now been abrogated by the Statute. There now remain only such limitations as flow from the Act itself, the operation of which as affecting the competence of Dominion legislation was saved by section 7 of the Statute, a section which excludes from the competence of the Dominion and Provincial Parliaments any power of"repeal, amendment or alteration" of the Act. But it is well known that section 7 was inserted at the request of Canada and for reasons which are familiar. It is doubtless true that the power of the Imperial Parliament to pass on its own initiative any legislation that it thought fit extending to Canada remains in theory unimpaired: indeed, the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal or disregard section 4 of the Statute. But that is theory and has no relation to realities. In truth Canada is in enjoyment of the full scope of self-government: its Legislature was invested with all necessary powers for that purpose by the Act, and what the Statute did was to remove the two fetters which have already been discussed.
 Among the powers which go to constitute self-government there are necessarily included powers to constitute the Law Courts and to regulate their procedure and to appoint their Judges: save for the provisions of the Act, these powers in regard to the then newly constituted Dominion would have all belonged to the King as the fountain of Justice: but by the Act these powers are vested in the Dominion Legislature, and thus pro tanto the prerogative is merged in the statutory powers. A most essential part of the administration of justice consists of the system of appeals. It is not doubted that with the single exception of what is called the prerogative appeal, that is, the appeal by special leave given in the Privy Council in London, matters of appeal from Canadian Courts are within the legislative control of Canada, that is of the Dominion or the Provinces as the case may be. Even conditions of the appeal "as of right" to the Privy Council, have been dealt with by the Parliaments of Quebec and Ontario, acting under the powers vested in them under the Constitutional Act, 1791.
 It may now be considered whether there is since the Statute any sufficient reason why this matter of the special or prerogative appeal to the King in Council should be treated, as according to the contentions on behalf of the petitioners, it should be

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	498
Judicial Committee.	
 treated, as being something quite special and as being a matter standing as it were on a pedestal by itself. Ought it not to be treated as simply one element in the general system of appeals in the Dominion? The appeal, if special leave is granted, is from the decision of a Canadian Court, and is to secure a reversal or alteration of an order of a Canadian Court: if it is successful, its effect will be that the order of the Canadian Court will be reformed accordingly. Rights in Canada and law in Canada will thus be affected. The appellant and respondent in any such appeal must be either Canadian citizens or persons who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Canadian Courts. Such appeals seem to be essentially matters of Canadian concern and the regulation and control of such appeals would thus seem to be a prime element in Canadian sovereignty as appertaining to matters of justice. But it is said that this class of appeal is a matter external to Canada: emphasis is laid particularly on the fact that the Privy Council sits in London, and that in form the appeal by special leave is not to the Judicial Committee as a Court of Law, but to the King in Council exercising a prerogative right outside and apart from any statute. As already explained this latter proposition is true only in form, not in substance. But, even so, the reception and the hearing of the appeal in London is only one step in a composite procedure which starts from the Canadian Court and which concludes and reaches its consummation in the Canadian Court. What takes place outside Canada is only ancillary to practical results which become effective in Canada. And the appeal to the King in Council is an appeal to an Imperial, not a merely British, tribunal.
 Their Lordships can see no valid reason since the Statute why the power to regulate or prohibit this type of appeal should not be held to be vested in the Dominion Parliament by the Act, with the consequence that it was validly exercised by the impugned section of the Act to amend the Criminal Code. Their Lordships do not construe the decision in  Nadan's Case (1) as involving the negation of that general power: the view there stated that the prerogative power to admit appeals could only be abrogated by an Imperial Statute was in their Lordships' opinion based on the special grounds that it would affect matters not confined locally to Canada and would contravene an Imperial Act. Before 1867, it had been held in  Cuvillier v. Aylwin (2) that the Constitution Act of 1791 had conferred power on the Canadian Legislature to take away the prerogative right of appeal: that decision was indeed 

[1935]
1 I.R.	Moore and Others v. Attorney-General and Others
Viscount Sankey L.C.	499
Judicial Committee.	
 criticised in the case of  Louis Marois (1), but the ground of actual criticism or perhaps dissent was not based on the general limits of power of the Canadian Legislature, but on the view that the relevant enactment of that Legislature was not sufficiently express in its terms: after 1867 the same ground for denying the validity of the enactment there in question was taken in  Cushing v. Dupuy (2) as already explained.
 It was further contended on behalf of the petitioners that if the Imperial Parliament desired to regulate in a constitutional enactment the prerogative right of petitioning for leave to appeal to the King in Council, an entirely different method of dealing with the problem was adopted, as was done in section 74 of the Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900, and in the South African Act. It is difficult to see how light can be thrown on the construction of the Act of 1867 by comparing an entirely different Act of 1900. But in any case the contrary argument may be drawn from the Commonwealth Act: the truer view may well be that the express limitation inserted in the Act of 1900 was so inserted because the general powers conferred on the Commonwealth by that Act would have included the abrogation of the prerogative appeal if the specific limitation had not been expressed. But it is to be noted also that the Commonwealth was invested with power to alter or amend the provisions of the Commonwealth Act relating to the prerogative appeals. A similar power is given in the South African Constitution. In the Report of the Imperial Conference, 1926, at p. 19, it is stated that "it was no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain that questions affecting judicial appeals (i.e., to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) should be determined otherwise than in accordance with the wishes of the part of the Empire primarily affected."
 Their Lordships have in this judgment been dealing only with the legal position in Canada in regard to this type of appeal in criminal matters. It is here neither necessary nor desirable to touch on the position as regards civil cases.
 For all these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the petition should be dismissed. As they are of this opinion on the sole ground that the petition is barred by section 17 of the amended Criminal Code, it is not necessary to discuss the merits of the petition.
 In the result their Lordships, being of opinion that the petition should be dismissed, will humbly so advise His Majesty.
 
[1935] I.R. 472