[1990]
1 I.R.	110	
Christopher McGimpsey and Michael McGimpsey Plaintiffs  v. Ireland, An Taoiseach and Others Defendants 
[S.C. No. 314 of 1988]
Supreme Court	1st March 1990 
	
Constitution - Executive - International relations - Agreement between governments of Ireland and UnitedKingdom in relation to Northern Ireland - Affirmation by both governments that change in status ofNorthern Ireland would only come about by consent of majority of population of Northern Ireland- Establishment of inter governmental conference to deal with political, security and legal matters andto promote cross border co-operation - Whether agreement constituted an unconstitutional fetteringof executive power to deal with international relations - Whether agreement inconsistent withconstitutional claim to whole island of Ireland as national territory - Constitution of Ireland, 1937,Articles 2, 3, 29, 40.Constitution - Challenge to constitutional validity of international treaty - Locus standi - Plaintiffs bornand resident in Northern Ireland - Whether plaintiffs citizens of Ireland - Whether plaintiffs had locusstandi to challenge treaty - Whether courts should entertain a constitutional challenge to the validityof an act the sole purpose of which was to achieve an objective directly contrary to the purpose of theconstitutional provision invoked.Constitution - Equality - Agreement between governments of Ireland and United Kingdom in relation toNorthern Ireland - Establishment of intergovernmental conference - Provision for Irish governmentto put forward views and proposals in relation to legislation, policy and devolution in so far as theyrelated to the interests of the minority community - Whether government there by abandoned concernfor majority - Whether invidious discrimination against majority - Whether agreement a "law"within the meaning of Article 40, s. 1 - Constitution of Ireland 1937, Article 40, s. 1.
 On the 15th November, 1985, an agreement, known as the Anglo-Irish Agreement, was reached between the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom. This agreement contained, inter alia provisions affirming the existing status of Northern Ireland and recognising that this status would only be changed with the consent of the majority of the population of Northern Ireland; provisions establishing an intergovernmental conference and a secretariat to deal with matters covered by the agreement and provisions allowing the Irish Government to put forward its views on devolution and major legislative and policy proposals within Northern Ireland in relation to the interests of the minority community in Northern Ireland. Other provisions related to security and legal matters, cross border co-operation and economic development.
 The plaintiffs, who were born in and resident in Northern Ireland, sought a declaration that the Anglo-Irish Agreement was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937. In particular, they argued that, in recognising the legitimacy of the present status of Northern Ireland, the Agreement violated Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution and that the intergovernmental conference and secretariat established by the Agreement restricted the Government of Ireland in the exercise of the external relations power of the State.
 The defendants argued, inter alia, that the plaintiffs did not have the locus standi necessary to challenge the agreement.
 In the High Court, Barrington J. rejected the defendants' plea of lack of locus standibut dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the Anglo-Irish Agreement (see  [1988] I.R. 567) .
 On appeal by the plaintiffs it was
Held by the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J., Walsh, Griffin, Hederman and McCarthy JJ.), in dismissing the appeal, 1, that, while the plaintiffs had neither alleged nor proved that they were citizens

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 of Ireland, having regard to the finding of the trial judge - against which no appeal had been taken - that the plaintiffs having been born in Ireland were, in contemplation of Irish law, citizens of Ireland, the Court would entertain the appeal on its merits.
Quaere: Whether any citizen has locus standi to challenge the constitutional validity of an act for the specific purpose of achieving an objective directly contrary to the constitutional provision invoked.
Per McCarthy J., that, as non-citizens of Ireland the plaintiffs did not have locus standito challenge the constitutional validity of a treaty made by the Government exercising the external relations power of the State under Article 29 of the Constitution.
The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála  [1966] I.R. 567  considered.
 2. That the claim to the national territory of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas contained in Article 2 of the Constitution was a claim of legal right.
 In re The Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975  [1977] I.R. 129  not followed.  Boland v. An Taoiseach  [1974] I.R. 338  and  The People v. Ruttledge  [1978] I.R. 376  considered.
 3. That the re-integration of the national territory was a constitutional imperative.
Russell v. Fanning  [1988] I.R. 505  followed.
 4. That the prohibition contained in Article 3 of the Constitution on the enactment of legislation applicable in Northern Ireland pending re-integration did not derogate from the territorial claim of legal right contained in Article 2 and did not create an estoppel against the State asserting the said claim.
 5. That the recognition by the Anglo Irish Agreement of the de facto situation in Northern Ireland whilst expressly disclaiming any abandonment of the claim to the re-integration of the national territory was not inconsistent with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution and there was no question of Ireland being estopped in international law from asserting that claim.
 6. That article 4, para. (c) and article 5, para. (c) of the Agreement, which allowed the Irish Government to put forward views on devolution and major legislation and policy issues were consistent with Ireland's devotion to international peace and co-operation pursuant to Article 29, s. 1 of the Constitution.
 7. That the Irish Government, in carrying out its agreed functions within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, remained free to do so in the manner which it thought appropriate and, accordingly, the Government's power to conduct external relations on behalf of the State was not fettered in breach of Article 29 of the Constitution.
Crotty v. An Taoiseach  [1987] I.R. 713  distinguished.
 8. That the Anglo-Irish Agreement did not constitute a "law" within the meaning of Article 40 of the Constitution.
 9. That the fact that the Irish Government could put forward views in relation to the position of the minority community in Northern Ireland pursuant to article 4, para. (c) and article 5, para. (c) of the Agreement did not constitute a failure to protect or to vindicate the rights of the majority population in Northern Ireland pursuant to Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 1 of the Constitution.
 10. That in so far as the Anglo-Irish Agreement provided a means whereby the re-integration of the national territory might be achieved by a process of consultation and discussion, it would never be inconsistent with the Constitution which is expressly devoted to peace and co-operation in international relations.
 Cases mentioned in this report:—
Boland v. An Taoiseach  [1974] I.R. 338; (1974) 109 I.L.T.R. 13.
Buckley and Others (Sinn Féin) v. The Attorney General  [1950] I.R. 67.
Cahill v. Sutton  [1980] I.R. 269.
Crotty v. An Taoiseach  [1987] I.R. 713; [1987] I.L.R.M. 400.
Eastern Greenland  (1933) P.C.I.J. 22.
Golder  (1975) 1 E.H.R.R. 524.

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In re The Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975  [1977] I.R. 129; (1976) 110 I.L.T.R. 69.
Kostan v. Ireland  [1978] I.L.R.M. 12.
McGimpsey v. Ireland  [1988] I.R. 567; [1989] I.L.R.M. 209 (H.C.).
Russell v. Fanning  [1988] I.R. 505; [1986] I.L.R.M. 401.
Re U.S. Nationals in Morocco, France v. U.S.A.  (1952) 19 I.L.R. 255; [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 176.
Temple of Preah Vihear  [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
The People v. Ruttledge  [1978] I.R. 376.
The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála  [1966] I.R. 567.

Appeal from the High Court.
 The facts have been summarised in the headnote and set out in the judgment of Finlay C.J., infra.
 The plaintiffs issued a plenary summons on the 9th May, 1987, seeking a declaration that the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was contrary to the Constitution of Ireland, 1937. This declaration was refused by the High Court (Barrington J.) on the 29th July, 1988. (See [1988] I.R. 567).
 By notice of appeal dated the 16th August, 1988, the plaintiffs appealed against the decision of the High Court. The appeal was heard by the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J., Walsh, Griffin, Hederman and McCarthy JJ.) on the 31st January, 1990 and the 1st February, 1990.
 The relevant provisions of the Constitution and of the Anglo-Irish Agreement are set out in the judgment of Finlay C.J., infra.
Hugh O'Flaherty S.C.  and Frank Clarke S.C.  (with them Gerard Hogan ) for the plaintiffs referred to  Crotty v. An Taoiseach ;  Russell v. Fanning ;  Boland v. An Taoiseach ;  Buckley and Others (Sinn Féin) v. The Attorney General ;  In Re The Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975 ;  Temple of Preah Vihear; Eastern Greenland ;Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956, ss. 2, 6 and 7; Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 1959, s. 4, sub-s. 2; Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973 (U.K.).
Eoghan Fitzsimons S.C.  (with him Esmond Smyth ) for the defendants referred to  Crotty v. An Taoiseach ;  Re U.S. Nationals in Morocco, France v. U.S.A. ; Golder ; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 31; The Single European Act.
Frank Clarke S.C.  in reply referred to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 31.
Cur. adv. vult.

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1 I.R.	McGimpsey v. Ireland
Finlay C.J.	113
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Finlay C.J.
	1st March 1990 
	
 This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against the dismissal on the 25th July, 1988, by order of the High Court made by Barrington J. of their claim for a declaration that the "Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom" made on the 15th November, 1985 (the Anglo-Irish Agreement) is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.
The parties
 The plaintiffs are two brothers, each of whom was born in Northern Ireland, and each of whom now resides in Northern Ireland.
 In the course of his judgment Barrington J. described the political ambitions and activities of both the plaintiffs in the following words:—
 "Both plaintiffs are members of the Official Unionist party of Northern Ireland. Both are deeply concerned about the present state of Northern Ireland and of all Ireland. Both reject any form of sectarianism and both have been involved in peace movements working to accommodate people of various traditions who live on the island of Ireland. Both gave evidence before the New Ireland Forum and, in oral and written submissions, attempted to explain to the Forum how the problem appeared to men fully committed to unionism but interested in finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Northern Ireland and of Ireland.
 Both believe that the Anglo-Irish Agreement has aggravated the problem and instead of solving the problem, has become part of it."
 The learned trial judge, having heard the plaintiffs in evidence, was satisfied that in the expression of these opinions and in their attitude to the problems with which the case is concerned, they were both sincere. Against these findings by the learned trial judge there is no form of appeal, nor is there any suggestion that they are otherwise than justified by the evidence which he heard.
The plaintiffs' claim
 The plaintiffs' claim for a declaration that the provisions of the Anglo-Irish Agreement are contrary to the provisions of the Constitution was directed in particular to Articles 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the Agreement, and the inconsistency alleged was with Articles 2, 3, 29 and 40 of the Constitution.
The defence
 The defendants in their defence, apart from joining issue on the claims of the plaintiffs, raised a special defence denying the locus standi of the plaintiffs in the following terms:—

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 "The plaintiffs do not have the locus standi necessary to seek the reliefs sought in the statement of claim on the grounds that neither of them has any interest or right which has or will suffer any injury or prejudice by reason of any of the matters alleged in the statement of claim or by reason of the coming into force of the said Agreement or at all, nor has either a common interest with any other person who could claim to be or to be likely to be adversely affected thereby."
 Amongst the submissions made on behalf of the defendants in the court below on foot of this plea of an absence of locus standi was that the plaintiffs should not be permitted to invoke Article 2 of the Constitution because they themselves do not believe that "the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland" and are only invoking the Article in a tactical manoeuvre.
 In his judgment the learned trial judge stated:—
 "Both plaintiffs were born in Ireland and are therefore, in contemplation of Irish law, citizens of Ireland."
 The statement of claim contains no claim that either plaintiff is a citizen of Ireland, although it is stated that the first plaintiff is the holder of an Irish passport. No evidence was given by either plaintiff that either he or either of his parents had made the prescribed declaration pursuant to s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956, or of any facts which would indicate that he was "otherwise an Irish citizen".
 It may well be that the plaintiffs are Irish citizens under s. 6, sub-s. 1 of the Act of 1956 because either or both of their parents were Irish citizens at the respective dates of their births, though this was not proved.
 Since the defendants made no submissions to this Court on this issue and have not sought to vary the finding of the learned trial judge to which I have referred, I will assume without deciding that each of the plaintiffs is an Irish citizen.
 The learned trial judge decided this issue of locus standi in favour of the plaintiffs in the following passage contained in his judgment:—
 "The present case is, to say the least, unusual and there is no exact precedent governing it. But it appears to me that the plaintiffs are patently sincere and serious people who have raised an important constitutional issue which affects them and thousands of others on both sides of the border. Having regard to these factors and having regard to the wording of the preamble to the Constitution and of Articles 2 and 3, it appears to me that it would be inappropriate for this court to refuse to listen to their complaints."
 Against this finding the defendants did not enter any cross-appeal or notice to vary. This Court, as it would be bound to do, raised the query as to the locus standi of the plaintiffs and the consequent jurisdiction of this Court to determine the issues raised on the appeal. Counsel for the defendants, upon that being raised, did not seek by any special submission or argument to vary the decision which had been reached by the learned trial judge.
 As a general proposition it would appear to me that one would have to entertain considerable doubt as to whether any citizen would have the locus standi to challenge the constitutional validity of an act of the executive or of a

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 statute of the Oireachtas for the specific and sole purpose of achieving an objective directly contrary to the purpose of the constitutional provision invoked. However, having regard to the evidence in this case, to the findings of fact made by the learned trial judge, and to the absence of any cross-appeal brought on behalf of the defendants, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs' claim in this case and their appeal against the dismissal of it by the High Court should be entertained on its merits.
The relevant constitutional provisions
 The relevant constitutional provisions are as follows:—
Article 2
 "The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas."
Article 3
 "Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann  and the like extra-territorial effect."
Article 29
 "1. Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality.
 2. Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.
 3. Ireland accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other States.
 4. 1 The executive power of the State in or in connection with its external relations shall in accordance with Article 28 of this Constitution be exercised by or on the authority of the Government."
Article 40
 1. All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law . . .
Article 40
 3. 1 The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.

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The Anglo-Irish Agreement
ARTICLE 1
 The two Governments
 (a) affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;
 (b) recognise that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland;
 (c) declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.
ARTICLE 2
 (a) There is hereby established within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council set up after the meeting between the two Heads of Government on the 6 November 1981, an Intergovernmental Conference (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference"), concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland, to deal, as set out in this Agreement, on a regular basis with
 (i) political matters;
 (ii) security and related matters;
 (iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice;
 (iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation.
 (b) The United Kingdom Government accepts that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference in so far as those matters are not the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. In the interests of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences. The Conference will be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland, but some of the matters under consideration will involve co-operative action in both parts of the island of Ireland, and possibly also in Great Britain. Some of the proposals considered in respect of Northern Ireland may also be found to have application by the Irish Government. There is no derogation from the sovereignty of either the Irish Government or the United Kingdom Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction.

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ARTICLE 4
 (a) In relation to matters coming within its field of activity, the Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government and the United Kingdom Government work together
 (i) for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland; and
 (ii) for peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation.
 (b) It is the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government that responsibility in respect of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be devolved within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. The Irish Government support that policy.
 (c) Both Governments recognise that devolution can be achieved only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions there. The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the modalities of bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland, in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community.
ARTICLE 5
 (a) The Conference shall concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination. Matters to be considered in this area include measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form in Northern Ireland.
 (b) The discussion of these matters shall be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland, but the possible application of any measures pursuant to this Article by the Irish Government in their jurisdiction shall not be excluded.
 (c) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, the Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may, where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected, put forward views on proposals for major legislation and on major policy issues, which are within the purview

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 of the Northern Ireland Departments and which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
Interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution
 Barrington J. in the course of his judgment identified from previous decisions what appeared to him to be two conflicting interpretations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. He concluded that the impugned provisions of the Agreement were not contrary to either of these interpretations, and that accordingly it was not necessary for him to decide between them.
 The first interpretation mentioned by the learned trial judge was derived by him from the decision of this Court on the reference of the  Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975  [1977] I.R. 129, and he quotes from that decision the following paragraph at p. 584:—
 "One of the theories held in 1937 by a substantial number of citizens was that a nation, as distinct from a State, had rights: that the Irish people living in what is now called the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland together form the Irish nation: that a nation has a right to unity of territory in some form be it as a unitary or federal state; and that the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, though legally binding was a violation of that national right to unity which was superior to positive law.
 This national claim to unity exists not in the legal but in the political order and is one of the rights which are envisaged in Article 2; it is expressly saved by Article 3 which states that the area to which the laws enacted by the parliament established by the Constitution apply."
 From that decision he concluded that the interpretation of the Articles was as follows: Article 2 contained a claim to the national territory of the whole of the island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas as a claim in the political order and not as a claim of legal right. Article 3 provided that, pending the re-integration of the national territory, the Parliament established by the Constitution could only enact laws with a like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann  and the like extraterritorial effect, and therefore could not enact laws with an area of application in the counties of Northern Ireland.
 Counsel for both parties submitted in the High Court, and repeated those submissions in this Court, that Article 2 constituted a claim of a legal right, but that, pursuant to Article 3, the Parliament established by the Constitution was entitled at any time it wished to enact laws applicable in the counties of Northern Ireland, though pending the re-integration of the national territory, laws enacted which did not otherwise provide are deemed to have the restricted area and extent mentioned in the article.
 In support of this submission they relied on the dictum of O'Keeffe P. in  Boland v. An Taoiseach  [1974] I.R. 338, and on the decision of O'Byrne J. in  The People v. Ruttledge  decided in 1947 but reported at [1978] I.R. 376.

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 I am not satisfied that the statement that "this national claim to unity exists not in the legal but the political order and is one of the rights which are envisaged in Article 2", necessarily means that the claim to the entire national territory is not a claim of legal right.
 The phrase occurs in a decision tracing the historical, political and social background to the Constitution, and seems more appropriately understood as a reference to the origin of the claim than to its nature. If, however, it is so construed, I would after careful consideration feel obliged to decline to follow it. I do not accept the contention that Article 3 is to be construed as permitting, during the period pending the re-integration of the national territory, the enactment of laws applicable in the counties of Northern Ireland.
 With Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution should be read the preamble, and I am satisfied that the true interpretation of these constitutional provisions is as follows:—
 1. The re-integration of the national territory is a constitutional imperative (cf. Hederman J. in  Russell v. Fanning  [1988] I.R. 505).
 2. Article 2 of the Constitution consists of a declaration of the extent of the national territory as a claim of legal right.
 3. Article 3 of the Constitution prohibits, pending the re-integration of the national territory, the enactment of laws with any greater area or extent of application or extra-territorial effect than the laws of Saorstát Éireann and this prohibits the enactment of laws applicable in the counties of Northern Ireland.
 4. The restriction imposed by Article 3 pending the re-integration of the national territory in no way derogates from the claim as a legal right to the entire national territory.
 The provision in Article 3 of the Constitution contained in the words "and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory" is an express denial and disclaimer made to the community of nations of acquiescence to any claim that, pending the re-integration of the national territory, the frontier at present existing between the State and Northern Ireland is or can be accepted as conclusive of the matter or that there can be any prescriptive title thereby created and an assertion that there can be no estoppel created by the restriction in Article 3 on the application of the laws of the State in Northern Ireland. This is of course quite distinct from the extra-territorial effect of the laws of the State in respect of matters occurring outside the State for which persons are made answerable in the courts of the State.
The grounds of the plaintiffs' claim
 Barrington J. has correctly identified the three main submissions on which the plaintiffs' claim rested in the High Court and they remain the same on the appeal to this Court.

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 "1. That the Agreement recognising the legitimacy of the present constitutional arrangements in respect of Northern Ireland, violates Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution;
 2. that, in as much as the Agreement establishes an intergovernmental conference and secretariat, it fetters the power of the Government to conduct the external affairs and powers of the state under Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution.
 3. that the State may not enter into a treaty whereby it commits itself to have regard to one section of the Irish nation (i.e. the "minority" population of Northern Ireland) and to disregard the interests of a section of the Irish people, namely, the "majority" community in Northern Ireland."
 In regard to the first of these grounds the plaintiffs relied, in addition to the terms of the Agreement and of the Constitution, upon submissions that the terms of the Agreement could in international law constitute an estoppel preventing a subsequent assertion of right to the re-integration of the national territory and also on a submission that the fact that the Agreement did not contain a fixed time for its duration added to the alleged constitutional inconsistency.
The decision
 With regard to these three main grounds of appeal I have come to the following conclusions.
 1. Inconsistency of the Agreement with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution
 The main source of this submission was article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In the course of his judgment Barrington J., after considering the details of that and other provisions of the Agreement, reached the following conclusion:—
 "It appears to me that in article 1 of the agreement the two Governments merely recognise the situation on the ground in Northern Ireland, (paragraph (b)), form a political judgment about the likely course of future events, (paragraph (a)), and state what their policy will be should events evolve in a particular way (paragraph (c))."
 I find myself in agreement with this economical but precise analysis of the provisions of article 1. The learned trial judge then concluded that on any interpretation of the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, these provisions of the Anglo-Irish Agreement were not in any way inconsistent with either of those two Articles. With that conclusion I am in complete agreement. There can be no doubt but that the only reasonable interpretation of article 1, taken in conjunction with the denial of derogation from sovereignty contained in article 2, para. (b), of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is that it constitutes a recognition of the de facto situation in Northern Ireland but does so expressly without

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 abandoning the claim to the re-integration of the national territory. These are essential ingredients of the constitutional provisions in Articles 2 and 3.
 This interpretation is not affected by the provisions of article 4, para. (c) or article 5, para. (c) nor are either of these two articles capable of any separate inconsistent interpretation. In so far as they accept the concept of change in thede facto status of Northern Ireland as being something that would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland these articles of the Agreement seem to me to be compatible with the obligations undertaken by the State in Article 29, ss. 1 and 2 of the Constitution, whereby Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation and its adherence to the principles of the pacific settlement of international disputes.
 The conclusion that these articles of the Anglo-Irish Agreement do not constitute any form of abandonment of the claim of right to the re-integration of the national territory but constitute instead a realistic recognition of the de factosituation in Northern Ireland leads to the consequential conclusion that the Anglo-Irish Agreement cannot be impugned on the basis of any supposed estoppel arising to defeat the constitutional claim to re-integration, nor on the basis of any indefinite duration in the Agreement.
 2. Fettering of the power of Government to conduct external relations in breach of Article 29 of the Constitution
 The submission made on this issue was that the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement were of similar character to the terms of the Single European Act which the decision of this Court in  Crotty v. An Taoiseach  [1987] I.R. 713 held to be inconsistent with the provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution.
 I am satisfied that this analogy is quite false. The Anglo-Irish Agreement is an agreement reached between two governments, both of whom have an acknowledged concern in relation to the affairs of Northern Ireland. It acknowledges that the Government of Ireland may make representations, put forward proposals, and try to influence the evolution of peace and order in Northern Ireland.
 The frameworks contained in the Agreement and structures created by it provide methods of carrying out these activities, it can be argued, in the manner most likely to make them effective and acceptable, namely, constant mutual discussion. The Government of Ireland at any time carrying out the functions which have been agreed under the Anglo-Irish Agreement is entirely free to do so in the manner in which it, and it alone, thinks most conducive to the achieving of the aims to which it is committed. A procedure which is likely to lead to peaceable and friendly co-operation at any given time must surely be consistent with the constitutional position of a state that affirms its devotion not only to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation but to that ideal founded on international justice and morality.

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 The basis of the decision of this Court in  Crotty v. An Taoiseach  [1987] I.R. 713 was that the terms of the Single European Act could oblige the Government in carrying out the foreign policy of the State to make the national interests of the State, to a greater or lesser extent, subservient to the national interests of other member states. I have no doubt that there is a vast and determining difference between the provisions of this Agreement and the provisions of the Single European Act as interpreted by this Court in  Crotty v. An Taoiseach  [1987] I.R. 713.
 3. Disregard of the interests of the "majority" community in Northern Ireland
 The submission made on the appeal in regard to this matter was that the provisions of the Anglo-Irish Agreement contained in article 4, para. (c) and article 5, para. (c) which expressly recognised the conference as a framework within which the Irish Government might put forward views and proposals on bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland, in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community, constituted a breach of Article 40, s. 1 of the Constitution. The Anglo-Irish Agreement is not "a law" within the meaning of that term contained in Article 40, s. 1 of the Constitution. A provision for the capacity of the Irish Government in regard to possible devolution in Northern Ireland to put forward views and proposals as to the modalities of bringing that about could not be the holding of any person equal or unequal before the "law".
 In the alternative, the submission was made that the provisions of this subclause of the Agreement were inconsistent with Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 1 of the Constitution. I am satisfied that they are not. The mere fact that there is an express acknowledgment in the event of discussions leading or intended to lead to devolution in Northern Ireland of the right of the Irish Government to bring forward views and proposals in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community in Northern Ireland is in no way an abandonment of concern by the Irish Government for the majority community in Northern Ireland.
 It does not seem to me that there are any grounds for suggesting that there has been an invidious or any discrimination between the two communities in Northern Ireland by virtue of the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
 I am satisfied, therefore, that all the grounds of the appeal brought by the plaintiffs must fail. I come to that conclusion from an analysis of each of the submissions that have been made, both in the High Court and in this Court. I would also point out, however, that there is, looking at the Anglo-Irish Agreement in its totality and looking at the entire scheme and thrust of the Constitution of Ireland a high improbability that a clear attempt to resolve the position with regard to the re-integration of the national territory and the position of Northern Ireland by a process of consultation, discussion and reasoned argument structured by constant communication between servants of each of the two states concerned could ever be inconsistent with a Constitution devoted to the ideals of ordered, peaceful international relations. I would dismiss this appeal.

[1990]
1 I.R.	McGimpsey v. Ireland
Walsh J.; Griffin J.; Hederman J.; McCarthy J.	123
S.C.	

Walsh J.
 I agree.

Griffin J.
 I agree.

Hederman J.
 I agree.

McCarthy J.
Locus standi
 The trial judge concluded that each of the plaintiffs was a citizen of Ireland. As citizens they are bound by the provisions of Article 9, s. 2 of the Constitution which prescribes that fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State are fundamental political duties of all citizens. Such fidelity and loyalty do not prohibit or restrict disagreement with the content of the Constitution nor with the actions of government. There are few citizens who have made a public declaration to uphold the Constitution which contains the constitutional imperative in its preamble that the unity of our country be restored and Article 2 which defines the national territory as the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas. The plaintiffs uphold the union of Northern Ireland with Britain, they reject Article 2 but claim that the Anglo-Irish Agreement is in conflict with it, is therefore invalid having regard to the provisions of the Constitution and thereby call it in aid to achieve their objective which is the maintenance of partition and of the union with Britain. They approbate and reprobate.
 There is a distinction between an objective and the means of achieving it. One does not look to the objective of a particular legal submission; one looks to the submission itself. One does not determine locus standi by motive but rather by objective assessment of rights and the means of protecting them. In  Cahill v. Sutton  [1980] I.R. 269 the plaintiff who invoked constitutional protection was denied the right to do so because the type of protection invoked would not, on the facts, have done her any good. It would have done her a great deal of good if the result was to condemn the section of the statute which defeated her claim, but the argument of constitutional injustice did not apply to her situation. Here the argument advanced by the plaintiffs does apply to the facts of their case, as Irish and as British citizens living in Northern Ireland, and in such case, their motive is irrelevant. It is commonplace for litigants to invoke the law for the worst of motives; many pleas of statutory defence may have a most venal purpose but that does not affect the validity of any such defence. The plaintiffs appear to be contending that, being made Irish citizens by this State, disapproving of the constitutional claim in Article 2, being concerned as to the effect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on them as residents of Northern Ireland, they are entitled to demand

[1990]
1 I.R.	McGimpsey v. Ireland
McCarthy J.	124
S.C.	
 of this State that, as the People make the rules, they must abide by them, whatever be the plaintiffs' motive or objective.
 Does this right, however, extend to a challenge to the making of a treaty by the Government pursuant to Article 29? In  Kostan v. Ireland  [1978] I.L.R.M. 12 a foreign captain of a fishery vessel successfully challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Fisheries (Consolidation) Act, 1959, under which he was prosecuted for unlawful fishing. In  Crotty v. An Taoiseach  [1987] I.R. 713 a successful challenge was made by an undoubted citizen against the ratification of part of the Single European Act. It seems unlikely that a non-citizen would have been allowed to maintain such proceedings. The citizens of the United Kingdom in Britain have a very real interest in the Anglo-Irish Agreement; is each one of them to be heard to challenge its validity as being repugnant to the Constitution of Ireland? I think not. Might such a claim be sustained at the suit of a person living in Northern Ireland but born outside of Ireland? I think not. The plaintiffs' right to sue, if right there be, must depend upon citizenship. In  The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála  [1966] I.R. 567 Teevan J., said at p. 600:—
 "Circumstances may exist by reason of which it would be no more than impertinent for a non-citizen to attack the constitutionality of one of our statutes, or by reason of which it would otherwise be necessary or prudent to take the point."
 In the Supreme Court, Walsh J., at p. 645 said:—
 "This Court expressly reserves for another and more appropriate case consideration of the effect of non-citizenship upon the interpretation of the Articles in question and also the right of a non-citizen to challenge the validity of an Act of the Oireachtas having regard to the provisions of the Constitution."
 In a case such as the present, in my judgment, a non-citizen does not have thelocus standi to maintain a challenge of the kind propounded here against the constitutional validity of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The issue of locus standi was raised in the defence and contested at the trial. The statement of claim does not allege that either plaintiff is a citizen of Ireland and neither plaintiff testified as to being a citizen or having made the prescribed declaration pursuant to s. 7, sub-s. 1 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956. In my view, the plaintiffs were not shown to be Irish citizens although Barrington J., in his judgment, stated that both plaintiffs were born in Ireland and "are therefore in contemplation of Irish law citizens of Ireland." No appeal or notice to vary was brought in respect of this finding. Because of this and the importance of the issue raised, whilst I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs have locus standi to maintain this action, I think it right to determine the main issue in the case.
The constitutional issue
 I have read the judgment delivered by the Chief Justice and I wholly agree with the conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed in their challenge to the Anglo-Irish

[1990]
1 I.R.	McGimpsey v. Ireland
McCarthy J.	125
S.C.	
 Agreement. I would wish to state my firm opinion that, whatever the political background to the wording of Article 2 of the Constitution, it is an unequivocal claim as of legal right that the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas (see O'Keeffe P. in  Boland v. An Taoiseach  [1974] I.R. 338 at p. 363).
 I would dismiss the appeal.
 Solicitors for the plaintiffs: Brendan Walsh & Partners.
 Solicitor for the defendants: Chief State Solicitor.
 Nuala Butler, B.L.
[1990] 1 I.R. 110