Supporting Documents:
152-17 Redacted Respndt Notice.pdf

THE SUPREME COURT

BETWEEN

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.4° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court directly from the High Court.

REASONS GIVEN:

ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED

COURT: High Court

DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 24th October, 2017

DATE OF ORDER: 24th October, 2017

DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 25th October, 2017

THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 21st November, 2017 AND WAS IN TIME.

General Considerations

1. The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O’Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’ direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.

2. Furthermore the application for leave filed and the respondent’s notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.

3. In that context it should be noted that the respondent opposes the grant of leave.

Decision

4. The starting point has to be to note that the order which is sought to be appealed was made in the context of the hearing by the High Court of an appeal from the Circuit Court. As this Court has pointed out in a number of determinations there remains an issue as to whether, and if so in what way, it is possible to appeal from such an order having regard to the clear statutory prohibition, upheld on many occasions by this Court under the previous constitutional regime, against there being any appeal from the High Court in such cases.

5. Whether, and if so in what circumstances, the new constitutional appellate architecture in place since the 33rd Amendment allows for an appeal at all whether to the Court of Appeal or to this Court is an issue yet to be finally determined. It should be noted that the respondent asserts that no appeal is available in a case such as this.

6. The practice which has been adopted in the past where this issue has arisen is for the Court to consider whether the general constitutional threshold is met for, if it is not, then the jurisdictional issues to which the Court has referred would not arise.

7. The grounds on which the order in this case is sought to be appealed do not, in the Court’s view, raise any issues of general public importance. They are specific to the facts of this case and relate to the appointment of a solicitor to have carriage of a sale, an award of costs and a contention that certain evidence should not have been relied on. Similar issues arise in virtually every case and do not come close to meeting the criteria of issues of general public importance so as to justify a second appeal.

8. In addition, as this Court pointed out in the PWC judgment referred to earlier, the “interests of justice” criteria is not met simply because it is said that the judgment sought to be appealed was wrong in some respect. As has been pointed out this Court is no longer, under the Constitution, a court for the correction of error.

9. On that basis the Court is not satisfied that the general constitutional threshold is met and it is unnecessary, therefore, to deal with the difficult jurisdictional issues which are referred to earlier.

10. As already noted, the respondent seeks to rely on a contention that no appeal is possible in a case such as this. The Court expresses no view on that question for it has not yet been the subject of a final decision of this Court. However, had it been the case that the Court considered that the general constitutional threshold was met it would have been necessary, as a preliminary question, to decide the issue of whether there is an appeal at all.

11. In all the circumstances the Court will refuse leave.

And it is hereby so ordered accordingly.