Supporting Documents:
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION BETWEENM. G. (SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND J. G.) APPLICANT AND
THE DIRECTOR OF OBERSTOWN CHILDREN’S DETENTION CENTRE THE MINISTER FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH AFFAIRE AND IRELAND RESPONDENTS
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.4° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES
RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court directly from the High Court.
REASONS GIVEN:
ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED
| COURT: High Court |
DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 3rd May, 2019 |
DATE OF ORDER: 3rd May, 2019 |
DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 7th May, 2019 |
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 4th June, 2019 AND WAS NOT IN TIME. |
General Considerations
1. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is set out in the Constitution. As is clear from the terms of Article 34.5.3° thereof and the many determinations made by this Court since the enactment of the Thirty-third Amendment, it is necessary, in order for this Court to grant leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal, that it be established by the applicant that the decision sought to be appealed involves a matter of general public importance, or that it is otherwise necessary in the interests of justice that there be an appeal to this Court. In addition, because this is an application for leave to appeal directly from the High Court, it is also necessary that it be established that there are “exceptional circumstances” warranting a direct appeal to this Court.
2. The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O’Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’ direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. Accordingly it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purpose of this determination.
3. It should be noted that any ruling in a determination is a decision particular to that application and is final and conclusive only as far as the parties are concerned. The issue calling for the Court’s consideration is whether the facts and legal issues meet the constitutional criteria as above identified. It will not, save in the rarest of circumstances, be appropriate to rely on a refusal of leave as having a precedential value relative to the substantive issues, if and when such issues should further arise in a different case. Where leave is granted on any issue, that matter will be disposed of in due course in the substantive decision of the Court.
4. The notices filed by the parties are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties in detail.
Background
5. This is a leap-frog application for leave to appeal to this Court against the decision of the High Court (Simons J. – see M.G. (Suing by his mother and next friend J.G.) v The Director of Oberstown [2019] IEHC 275).
6. The applicant claims that, as a young offender detained in Oberstown, his rights to dignity and bodily integrity were breached by the respondents when he was (as he sees it) punished by separation from his peers for a period of time after his involvement in an incident. He argues that this was a punishment imposed without any procedural safeguards such as those applicable to adult offenders under the Prison Rules 2007. He claims that this latter aspect amounted to a breach of the constitutional guarantee of equality.
Decision
7. The trial judge made four significant findings based on the evidence before him: that the separation measures were necessary to address an urgent situation; that the measures were very limited and were reduced in severity over the course of six days; that the measures were not intended to serve a punitive objective; and that the first named respondent complied with the Single Separation Procedures Code. His conclusions on the legal issues were very largely based on those findings. It is apparent that the applicant takes issue with, at least, the third and fourth, but in this application he has not engaged with them beyond the level of bare assertions that the trial judge erred.
8. Issues concerning the treatment of young detainees are capable of giving rise to questions of law of public importance (see, for example, the determination in the unrelated case of M.G. v Director of Oberstown [2019] IESCDET 46). However, there is a clearly established principle that this Court, under the current constitutional regime, does not have as part of its role the correction of factual findings. In the view of the Court, this is a matter that should more properly be appealed (at least in the first instance) to the Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal to this Court will accordingly be refused and the question of an extension of time does not arise.
And it is hereby so ordered accordingly.
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