Supporting Documents:

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

BETWEEN

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Second Named Defendant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal

REASONS GIVEN:

1. Jurisdiction

This determination relates to an application by the second named defendant in the underlying proceedings (“Mrs. Darcy”) for leave to appeal, under Art. 34.5.3 of the Constitution, from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Charleton, Peart and Irvine JJ.) delivered on 14 July 2016. The order appealed against was also made on the 14 July 2016 and perfected on the 18 July 2016. As is clear from the terms of the Constitution and many determinations made by this Court since the enactment of the 33rd Amendment it is necessary, in order for this Court to grant leave, that it be established that the decision sought to be appealed either involves a matter of general public importance or that it is otherwise in the interest of justice necessary that there be an appeal to this Court.

The Court considers it desirable to point out that a determination of the Court on an application for leave, while it is final and conclusive so far as the parties are concerned, is a decision in relation to that application only. The issue is whether the questions raised, and the facts underpinning them, meet the constitutional criteria for leave. It will not, save in the rarest of circumstances, be appropriate to rely on a refusal of leave a having a precedential value in relation to the substantive issues in the context of a different case. Where leave is granted, any issue canvassed in the application will in due course be disposed of in the substantive decision of the Court.

2. The Proceedings

In these proceedings generally the plaintiff bank (“AIB”) sought orders to the effect that very substantial debts alleged to be due by the defendants (“the Darcys”) to AIB stand well charged on certain properties together with ancillary orders. AIB’s proceedings succeeded in the High Court before Keane J. and an appeal was brought to the Court of Appeal.

3. The Order appealed against

There are in fact two separate applications for leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal currently before this Court. This determination relates to an application by Mrs Darcy. In that context it is necessary to refer to the previous history of these proceedings (insofar as they relate to a previous order of this Court) which are fully set out in the determination in respect of the application for leave to appeal brought by Mr. Darcy. For the reasons set out in its judgment (and referred to in this Court’s determination in the application for leave to appeal by Mr. Darcy) the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal brought by the Darcys and it is in respect of that dismissal that Mrs Darcy seeks leave to appeal to this Court.

4. The Contentions of the Parties

The notice of application for leave to appeal together with the response is published along with this determination. It is not, in those circumstances, necessary to set out in full detail the contents of those documents. For the purposes of this determination it is sufficient to summarise the basis upon which the applicant suggests that the constitutional threshold for leave to appeal has been met.

It is suggested on behalf of Mrs Darcy that it is a matter of general public importance that the previous order of this Court should be obeyed. While there is mention of issues concerning the family home, those issues appear to be only raised for the purposes of suggesting that it is in the interests of justice that the general point concerning compliance with the previous orders of this Court be considered and decided by this Court. In addition, various points concerning costs orders are made.

AIB, in its responding notice, suggests that no novel point, meeting the constitutional threshold of general public importance or the interests of justice, is raised.

5. Discussion

As is clear from a range of determinations made by this Court since the 33rd Amendment to the Constitution came into force, the constitutional function of this Court is no longer that of an appeal court designed to correct alleged errors by the trial court. Where it is said that the High Court has simply been in error in some material respect the constitutional regime now in place confers jurisdiction to correct any such error as may be established on the Court of Appeal. Rather the text of the Constitution now in place makes clear that an appeal to this Court, whether directly from the High Court under Art. 34.5.4 or from the Court of Appeal under Art. 34.5.3, requires that it be established that the decision sought to be appealed against involves a matter of general public importance or that it otherwise is in the interest of justice necessary to allow an appeal to this Court. It will rarely be necessary in the interest of justice to permit an appeal to this Court simply because it is said that the lower court was in error. An appeal to the Court of Appeal provides the appropriate remedy for any error made by the High Court. Likewise a party which has had the opportunity to have the decision of the High Court reviewed by the Court of Appeal will have had the benefit of having been able to put its case both at trial and on appeal. Without more the interests of justice will not require a further review on appeal to this Court.

Against that background it is necessary to address the basis on which it is said that the constitutional threshold is met in this case.

The issue concerning the proper interpretation of the previous order made by this Court in these proceedings has already been dealt with in the determination concerning the application by Mr. Darcy for leave to appeal. It is a misconstruction of the previous order of this Court to suggest that it required the previous proceedings to actually go to trial. Rather the order simply required that the proceedings continue as if they had been commenced by plenary summons and, in that context, did not preclude the proceedings being discontinued just as any other proceedings commenced by plenary summons could be discontinued.

Whatever may or may not be the merits of the points raised about costs, it does not seem to this Court that any of those issues raise points of general public importance or issues where it is in the interests of justice that there be a further appeal to this Court.

6. Conclusion

The Court, therefore, refuses leave to appeal under Art. 34.5.3.

And It is hereby so ordered accordingly.