Supporting Documents:

Resp Notice 45-2019.pdfAFL 45-2019.pdf

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Defendant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal

REASONS GIVEN:

ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED

COURT: Court of Appeal

DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 20th February, 2019

DATE OF ORDER: 20th February, 2019

DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 22nd February, 2019

THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 12th March, 2019 AND WAS IN TIME.

General considerations

1 The general principles applied by this court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal, having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the Thirty-third Amendment, have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this court in B.S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134, (Unreported, Supreme Court, 6 December 2017) and in a unanimous judgment of a full court delivered by O’Donnell J. in Quinn Insurance Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers [2017] IESC 73, [2017] 3 I.R. 812. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purpose of this determination.

2 Furthermore, the application for leave filed and the respondent’s notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law), and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties in any detail. No aspect of this ruling has precedential value as a matter of law.

Decision

3 The applicant and defendant, Michael Butler, seeks leave to appeal to this court from the decision of the Court of Appeal of 20 February 2019 (Irvine J.; Edwards and Whelan JJ. concurring) in which the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the decision of the High Court (Twomey J.) on 3 April 2016, whereby he granted judgment to the Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank in the sum of €521,427.26 with an order for costs to be taxed in default of agreement. The court also dismissed an application for discovery of certain categories of documents. In simple terms, it could not be disputed that the sum of €521,427.26 was due and owing to the plaintiff bank. The applicant sought to argue that he should be entitled to resist judgment, or to a stay on judgment, because of a potential counterclaim against the Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland in relation to the loss of certain title deeds, which he contended could properly be maintained as a form of defence against the respondent, arguing, it appears, that the corporate veil should be pierced in these circumstances. He also argued, that he had not received a full or fair hearing in the High Court.

4 The Court of Appeal had a full transcript of the hearing before the High Court judge. It concluded that no error had been established in the approach of the High Court. In doing so, the court applied well established case law on the circumstances in which judgment may be entered in a liquidated claim and where it is alleged that there are circumstances giving rise to a counterclaim which could be set off against the plaintiff’s claim, or form the basis of a separate claim, or an application for a stay.

5 The court is satisfied that this case raises no issue of law of general public importance, but rather is the application of well established law relating both to the application for judgment and to discovery. Furthermore, the decision of the High Court was in turn reviewed carefully and comprehensively by the Court of Appeal. In the circumstances, the court refuses leave to appeal to this court.

And it is hereby so ordered accordingly.