Supporting Documents:
81-17 AFL.pdf81-17 Rspndt Notce.doc
SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
AND
SABRINA CUMMINS APPLICANT
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES
Result: Leave to appeal is refused
Reasons Given:
1 The applicant seeks leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal of the 23rd of March 2017, dismissing her appeal against her conviction for murder. The essential ground relied on is what transpired when the applicant, having given evidence in her own defence, and furthermore, which was damaging to the case of a co-accused, refused to be cross-examined. The trial judge stated to the accused’s counsel, and then again to the accused herself, that if she persisted he would deal with the matter as a serious contempt of court in any event. Furthermore, if she was convicted of manslaughter he would take the matter into account on sentencing, and if convicted of murder, he would make reference to this matter in the sentencing remarks, which could be taken into account if and when a person convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, might be released. The applicant then changed her mind and returned to the witness box, gave evidence and was convicted.
2 The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal distinguishing the case from the UK case of the R v John Joseph O’Boyle (1991) 92 Cr App R 202, where an accused who refused to continue with evidence was forcibly brought back to the witness box by order of the judge.
3 The circumstances of this trial were both unusual and case specific. The applicant complains that the trial judge’s statements were threats which put pressure upon her to continue her evidence. It is true that in the immediate aftermath, the trial judge indicated that he would not proceed as he had suggested and, in doing so, he described his observations somewhat colloquially as “threats”.
4 The events here occurred in the course of a trial in circumstances which were unusual and could not have been anticipated. The Court of Appeal was not required to address a situation where any of the matters raised by the trial judge transpired. It is not necessary accordingly to consider if, for example, it would have been appropriate or permissible to consider the matter as capable of influencing sentence. However it seems clear that refusal of a witness in such circumstances to continue to give evidence, or to answer questions properly put to her would amount to contempt of court. The applicant had no right to refuse to be cross examined. In continuing to give evidence, the applicant was complying with a legal obligation. It cannot be argued that she was improperly subjected to pressure which led her to refrain from doing something she was entitled to do. The question, therefore, was whether in the context of the trial as a whole this unusual passage rendered the trial unfair. That is a matter within the expertise and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal and raises no issue of general public importance. Accordingly the application is refused.
And It is hereby so ordered accordingly.
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