Supporting Documents:

THE SUPREME COURT

BETWEEN

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to Ruth Moram to appeal to this Court from the order of the Court of Appeal

REASONS GIVEN:

1. This determination relates to an application brought by Ruth Moran, the applicant, referred to as “the applicant”, in which she seeks leave to appeal to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 20th July, 2015.

2. The Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Ireland, Andrew Beeston, Peter Van Benthem, and Martyn Bell, the respondents, are referred to collectively as “the respondents”.

3. This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Court of Appeal in the circumstances described in Article 34.5.3° of the Constitution, which states:-

“3° The Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the Court of Appeal if the Supreme Court is satisfied that –

i the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or

ii in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court.”

5. The constitutional framework established by the 33rd Amendment of the Constitution thus requires, in order for a party to be entitled to appeal to this Court from a decision of the Court of Appeal, that it be demonstrated that either “a matter of general public importance” arises, or that “in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal” to this Court.

6. The statutory framework for the exercise of the right to apply to this Court for such leave is to be found in the Court of Appeal Act, 2014, and in particular the provisions of s. 44 of that Act which inserts a new s. 7 into the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961. The Rules of Court are set out in the amended Order 58.

7. The Constitution has retained the entitlement of one appeal as of right from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, subject to express exclusions or regulation by statute. What is sought here is a second appeal. The jurisdiction to bring an appeal to this Court is confined principally to cases where, as a result of the determination of the Court of Appeal, the decision of that Court is such that the issues raised on a proposed appeal would involve a matter of general public importance or would be such that it is in the interests of justice that there be a further appeal to this Court.

8. In this application the applicant seeks to appeal from the entire decision of the Court of Appeal.

9. The applicant is a lay litigant, which the Court has borne in mind in considering the application.

10. The grounds advanced as to why this Court should grant leave to appeal are as follows:-

“(i) The Appeal Court has ruled that the [respondents’] use of unfair procedures is wrong and illegal. But they were unable to right the wrong. The judges kindly stated the [applicant] had made a wrong public, but it has not been so widely publicised as to be effective. The Charity Regulator does not have the staff or the necessary powers to deal with this situation.

(ii) On being notified of the expected appeal to the Supreme Court the [respondents’] solicitor sent an email which demonstrated their clients’ refusal to comply with the law regarding the use of fair procedures. They refused to accept the offer that the [applicant] would not file an appeal if the [respondents] refrained from using unfair procedures and would not press for the 50% costs.

(iii) If the Watch Tower Society is allowed to continue using their unfair procedures, more people, adults and children, will be harmed and some will commit suicide. The [applicant] cannot find it in her conscience to allow that to happen without taking every step possible to prevent it.

(iv) The Statute of Limitations Act 1957 S71.1 requires the claimant to use ‘reasonable diligence’ in discovering fraud. The Appeal Court implies that this means the claimant must take a matter to court in case something is discovered during Discovery. However the Act states that the fraud should be discovered first, before taking a matter to court. The Appeal Court’s decision will affect other parties.

(v) There have been several shocking revelations in this legal case. The [respondents] do not accept a duty of care, despite having a judicial system and having children under their authority. They believe that being a voluntary organisation means they do not have to use fair procedures. This belief is lethal. The 1st named [respondent] does not allow its members to read the secret elders’ book, nor gives them the information therein, even though it contains procedures, ultra vires the public statutes and in breach of human rights, which affect members. (Please see the Constitution Article 40.3 which implies the right to fair procedures).

(vi) With regard to justice the [applicant] was injured to the point of nearly losing her life by the criminal activity of the [respondents]. She is not out of time to bring this case, but has been penalised as to costs. She cannot find any justice in the situation whereby she has been left with serious injuries, has incurred many expenses to deal with the injuries for the rest of her life, and yet has to pay the defendants for committing these crimes.

(vii) It’s not justice to allow criminal activity to go on with no restraint so that the [respondents] can continue to harm others in the future. It’s not justice to allow the [respondents] to conceal their crimes long enough to be able to claim the [applicant’s] case is statute barred.”

12. The respondents oppose the application for leave to appeal.

13. The respondents’ reasons for opposing leave to appeal are as follows:-

“(i) The decision in respect of which leave to appeal is sought does not involve a matter of general public importance;

(ii) It is not in the wider interests of justice that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court as there is no point of law or other issue of general importance that falls to be determined;

(iii) The matter was very fairly and fully investigated at the hearing before Mr. Justice Barrett who reached the conclusion that it was proper and lawful to strike out the proceedings as statute barred. His careful memorandum of the proceedings confirms the care with which he approached his task. There is no evidence that he failed to consider any relevant matter nor is there any evidence that he incorrectly took any matter into account. There is no evidence of any judicial error;

(iv) Similarly, as the transcript of the judgment shows, the [applicant] had a full and fair hearing before the Court of Appeal that unanimously found no reason to interfere with the decision of Mr. Justice Barrett;

(v) The respondents respectfully submit that the [applicant] is of the manifestly wrong view that the function of the Court system is to provide a platform to enable her to continually air her personal grievances against the First Named Respondent in particular, which grievances are without any foundation in law or in fact. The Respondents’ position is that the matter must be determined according to the relevant legal principles, which Mr. Justice Barrett and the Court of Appeal have manifestly done;

(vi) Accordingly the Respondents invite the Supreme Court to refuse leave to appeal and to make the appropriate order against the [applicant] requiring her to make a contribution towards the costs incurred by the Respondents in relation to this application.”

“A very short and succinct summary of what occurred at that time is to be found in the medical report which was put before the court by the plaintiff Ms. Moran. Under the heading ‘History’ the doctor says that in 2004, Ruth Moran was accused of slander by a member of her church. She was then visited at home by two of the church elders and this caused her great stress and anxiety as a result of which she subsequently left her church. Then there is set out a history of the symptoms and of her consulting her medical adviser in May, 2004, suffering from stress, anxiety and low mood and also episodes of tearfulness.”

“The doctor goes on to say that Ms. Moran decided to take matters to her solicitor. On the 8th May, 2009, Ms. Moran received a report from her solicitor after a member of the church had contacted her solicitor. She was very traumatised by this report.”

17. The Court of Appeal identified the litigation as a claim for personal injuries by the applicant which injuries were claimed to have been sustained as a result of unlawful activities of the respondents in 2004.

18. However, the Court of Appeal identified earlier proceedings commenced by the applicant in the Circuit Court, which were struck out by His Honour Judge O’Sullivan. An appeal to the High Court was brought by the applicant, which was heard and determined by Hedigan J. in March 2012. The High Court, in those defamation proceedings, decided that the proceedings should be struck out.

19. After that these proceedings were commenced in 2013.

20. The respondents claimed that this litigation is statute barred because all the relevant information was available to her in 2004. The High Court took a more benign view, as did the Court of Appeal, and began to reckon from 2009. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that as of 2009 the applicant “… was in a position to contend that unlawful activity on the part of the [respondents] had given rise to personal injuries being sustained by her.”

21. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that evidence was available to her in 2009 as to unlawful activity and injury sustained as a result. Additional information available to her in 2011 and 2012 was held as not to make a difference except as to the quality of evidence she could lead at a trial.

22. The Court of Appeal referred to the claim of fraud. It held:-

“[The applicant] alleges that the later information which she obtained was the subject of some form of concealed fraud. I use the term in the technical sense in which it is mentioned in the statute of limitations. It is not fraud in the sense of culpable wrong, failure to disclose or misrepresentation or plain dishonesty.”

“Indeed from the answers which she gave this afternoon, it appears that this material became known to her as a result of her finding it on the internet, rather than it being the subject of any misrepresentation of the true position to her by the [respondents]. Notwithstanding the volume of paper that has been furnished to the court, there is, as far as I can ascertain, no material there which would support a claim of some form of misrepresentation or dishonesty or suppression of information on the part of the [respondents].”

25. Thus, even giving the applicant the benefit of the later date in 2009, as the date for the Statute of Limitations, the proceedings were well outside the applicable limitation period.

26. The Court of Appeal found no error in the decision of the High Court.

27. This is not an appellate court to correct error. However, even if that lower standard were applicable, the Court sees no error in the decision of the Court of Appeal.

28. The applicant has not raised a point of substance for the jurisdiction of this Court. No matter of general public importance has been raised. Further, the Court is satisfied that it would not be necessary in the interests of justice that there be an appeal to this Court. The Court is satisfied that the constitutional threshold for leave to appeal to this Court has not been met.

29. The Court has borne in mind that the applicant is a lay litigant, as clearly did the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, Kelly J., stated:-

“It is clear that Ms. Moram has a deep seated belief that she was wronged by the activities of the [respondents]. That is so notwithstanding her failure in the Circuit Court and on appeal in the High Court in respect of defamation proceedings and notwithstanding the order that was made in the High Court which I would affirm.

17. One cannot but have sympathy for the position in which Ms. Moram finds herself. She seems to be driven by a desire to ensure that what she has discovered is brought to the attention of the public. This is not public interest litigation. This is a personal injuries claim which she has brought. Insofar as she has sought to ventilate her concerns in this regard, she has now done so in a public court. This the eighteenth time that her complaints have been before the courts in one shape or another. So I suspect that, insofar as she seeks to do right by her fellow citizens she has done so. She has probably brought her complaints home to the [respondents] also. Even though her claim has been dismissed, I have no doubt that she can feel that she has achieved something to her credit in bringing to light what she perceives to be wrongdoing. But insofar as the issue of the Statute of Limitations is concerned, I take the view that this appeal has to be dismissed.”

31. The applicant is not entitled to a further appeal. The Court does not grant leave to the applicant to appeal to this Court from the order of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 20th July, 2015.

And it is hereby so ordered accordingly.