Supporting Documents:
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
SIMON COYLE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT DEFENDANT/APPLICANT
ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED
| COURT: Court of Appeal |
DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 15th October, 2018 |
DATE OF ORDER: 15th October, 2018 |
DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 7th November, 2018 |
| APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES |
| RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to appeal to this Court, pursuant to Article 34.5.3. |
Introduction
1. This is an application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Peart, McGovern and Baker JJ.), dated the 15th October, 2018. The order of the Court of Appeal was made on the same day and was perfected on the 7th November, 2018. The Court of Appeal refused to make an order to extend the time within which an appeal could be issued against an order of the High Court (Stewart J.), dated the 13th March, 2018, wherein the applicant was ordered not to interfere with, or attempt to frustrate, the activities of the respondent as receiver of a property plus costs. For a unanimous Court, Peart J. held that this was a matter for the trial judge. It was further ordered that the applicant pay to the respondent the costs of the motion to be taxed in default of agreement.
General Considerations
2. The principles applied in deciding whether or not to grant leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution under the 33rd Amendment have been considered in many determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O’Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purpose of this determination.
3. The application for leave filed, and the respondent’s notice thereto, are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties in detail.
The Applicant’s Case
4. The applicant argues that there is no domestic statute in relation to contempt of court, that it is derived from the common law of England and Wales, and therefore that it cannot be lawfully applied this jurisdiction. He says that, when Stewart J. made an order directing An Garda Síochána to bring him before the High Court due to contempt of certain court orders, this was contrary to his human rights generally, his due process rights and the principles of natural justice. He argues that the application of this concept in Ireland would be inconsistent with the Constitution, and consequently submits that it is of general public importance that clarity be brought to this area of law.
5. Additionally, the applicant contends that it is of general public importance that:
a) Perfected court orders be factually accurate and represent the order made by the court in question;
b) Irish and European Union law is applied universally and equally; and
c) This Court clarifies whether the courts have actively employed intimidation, harassment and coercion in the present proceedings.
The Respondent’s Case
6. The respondent asserts that this case raises no matter of general public importance and that it is not in the interests of justice necessary that there be an appeal to this Court. He contends that the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal involve the application of well-established legal principles: those relating to the extension of time for an appeal to be issued against an order of the High Court. It is said that the applicable legal principles were not materially disputed before the Court of Appeal, and that no effort was made by the applicant to pass the constitutional threshold for leave to appeal to this Court to be granted. The respondent argues that no appeal to this Court should lie in circumstances where the issues raised have been exhaustively and properly examined by two courts.
Discussion
7. Three matters must be addressed. First, is worth providing a very brief clarification of the law in relation to the points made by the applicant regarding contempt (see para. 4 above). In the judgment of this Court in Keegan v. de Búrca [1973] 1 I.R. 223, at p. 227, Ó Dálaigh C.J. commented:
“The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is not new law… Civil contempt usually arises where there is a disobedience to an order of the court by a party to the proceedings and in which the court has generally no interest to interfere unless moved by the party for whose benefit the order was made. Criminal contempt is a common-law misdemeanour and, as such, is punishable by both imprisonment and fine at discretion... Civil contempt, on the other hand, is not punitive in its object but coercive in its purpose of compelling the party committed to comply with the order of the court…” (Emphasis added)
It is clear both that contempt of court is a legitimate, long-standing Irish legal principle, and that its application by the High Court was, prima facie, lawful. This was a case of civil contempt.
8. Second, the issues involved in this application are not of general public importance, nor is it in the interests of justice necessary that there be an appeal to this Court. The observations made by the respondent, identified at para. 6 above, are correct. While each of the three points raised by the applicant at para. 5 above could have hypothetical importance, it has not been shown that they actually arise in this case. Thus, the question as to whether they reach the level of importance required for leave to appeal to be granted simply does not arise.
9. Third, a primary consideration in this application for leave to appeal is para. 8(d) of Practice Direction SC 16, which relates to applications for leave to appeal, and reads as follows:
“8. Additional Papers
…
(d) Where the required papers are not filed within 8 weeks after the filing of the application and no good reason is given for the delay, the Registrar may refer the application to the court without the required accompanying papers for such directions or orders as appear appropriate to the court.” (Emphasis added)
10. This time limit was not met. An application for leave to appeal to this Court was lodged by the applicant on the 21st December, 2018. By letter, also dated the 21st December, 2018, the applicant was directed by the Supreme Court Office (“SCO”) that four copies of a book of additional papers in support of his application for leave to appeal must be filed within seven days of that application. Not only was this not complied with, but it fell to the SCO to write again to the applicant on the 13th March, 2019. In that letter, the applicant was:
a) Reminded of the time limits outlined in the letter of the 21st December, 2018;
b) Informed about para. 8(d) of the Practice Direction;
c) Advised that he must apply by way of motion to the courts below for access to the transcripts of their respective judgments; and
d) Instructed that if the books of additional documents were not lodged by the 22nd March, 2019, the application for leave to appeal could be referred to this Court at any time without further notice.
The applicant responded by letter dated the 20th March, 2019, to say that, in a meeting with Courts Service staff, he indicated that, having written to the “registrars/judges”, he was unable to retrieve the judgments of the courts below. He then requested the assistance of the SCO in obtaining the written judgments, ostensibly following the advice of a member of the Courts Service.
11. Without questioning the bona fides of the applicant’s actions, the effect of his decision not to comply with the instructions of the SCO is plain. The applicant did not meet the eight week time limit of para. 8(d), did not apply by way of motion for access to the transcripts of the ex tempore judgments of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, and, because no apparent effort was made to compile the books of additional documents between the notification of this requirement on the 21st December, 2019, and the letter of the 13th March, 2019, the applicant, it appears, was not in a position to furnish the four copies required by the 22nd March, 2019.
12. Put simply, the applicant was asked to supply certain documents to this Court and failed to do so. No reason was provided for this. Thus, in addition to the grounds of refusal outlined earlier (para. 8), this application for leave to appeal is dismissed on the ground of failure to comply with para. 8(d) of Practice Direction SC 16.
Decision
13. For the above reasons, leave to appeal to this Court is refused.
And it is hereby so ordered accordingly.
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