Supporting Documents:
48-19 Resp Notice.pdf48- 2019 AFL .pdf

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACTS 1954-2011 AND IN THE MATTER OF DIANNE HALLAHAN A SOLICITOR

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal

REASONS GIVEN:

ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED

COURT: Court of Appeal

DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 8th February, 2019

DATE OF ORDER: 8th February, 2019

DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 11th February, 2019

THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 15th March, 2019 AND WAS IN TIME.

Reasons Given

1. This determination relates to an application for leave to appeal.

2. The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O’Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’ direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.

3. Furthermore, the application for leave filed and the Respondent’s notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.

4. In that context it should be noted that the Respondent does oppose the grant of leave.

Decision

5. The Applicant retained the professional services of the Respondent (a solicitor) in January 2016, for the purposes of assisting her in a family law dispute relating to access to her grandchild. An Application brought to the Cork District Court by the Respondent on behalf of the Applicant became the source of dispute, with the Applicant being unsatisfied with the outcome and as a result, laying a complaint of misconduct against the Respondent with the Law Society. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal made a decision on 2nd February 2017 that no prima facie case of misconduct had been made out and that no further investigation would be necessary. That decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal was the subject of an Appeal to the High Court, in which a judgment was delivered by Kelly P. on 18th May 2017 in which the decision of the disciplinary tribunal was affirmed and the Appeal was dismissed. The High Court decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal and on 8th February 2019, Peart J. delivered an ex tempore judgment (McGovern J. and Baker J. in agreement) dismissing the Appeal. Peart J. found that the Applicant’s case, even taken at its height, could not sustain a finding of professional misconduct against the Respondent and that no error of law or fact was made by the High Court in dismissing the Appeal against the decision of the disciplinary tribunal. It is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal which the Applicant seeks leave to appeal to this Court.

6. It has been found by both the High Court and the Court of Appeal that the disciplinary tribunal did not misdirect itself in finding that no prima facie case of professional misconduct had been made out. The Applicant contends that this case raises a matter of public importance because inter alia she is an Applicant who describes herself as legally blind and unrepresented and therefore was at a disadvantage throughout the proceedings compared to the Respondent who is a qualified solicitor. She also contends that the seriousness of the alleged misconduct make this a matter of public interest. Similar grounds are put forward to contend that an appeal to this Court would be in the interests of justice. In response, the Respondent contends that the Applicant’s case does not raise any matter of public interest and that the submissions regarding the Applicant’s disability and lack of legal representation are distinct matters with no bearing on the validity of the lower courts’ findings. The Respondent submits that another appeal would essentially be a re-ventilation of the same issues and that this would not be warranted in the interests of justice.

7. While this Court has every understanding and empathy for the challenges facing visually impaired Applicants and affirms the importance of all Applicants’ constitutional rights to be heard by the Courts, the limitation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is explained in para.2 of this Determination. Peart J. noted that the High Court and the Court of Appeal had listened to complaints made by the Applicant which went beyond the scope of her written complaint to the Law Society. The very detailed and explanatory nature of the Court of Appeal judgment demonstrates the fact that the Applicant’s complaints have been heard and considered in full accordance with her Constitutional right to be heard. In the circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised by the Applicant do not meet the constitutional threshold for an appeal to this Court and that accordingly, the application for leave is refused.

8. The Applicant’s application for leave to Appeal and the Respondent’s Notice were filed out of time in this matter and both parties have made submissions in that regard. In the circumstances that leave to Appeal has not been granted to the Applicant for the reasons set out above, it is not necessary for the Court to comment on the merits of the submissions regarding the lateness of filing.

9. Leave to appeal is not granted.

And it is hereby so ordered accordingly.