Supporting Documents:
 
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION ALLIED IRISH BANKS plc PLAINTIFF / RESPONDENT AND
MICHAEL QUINN AND BRIGID QUINN DEFENDANTS / APPLICANTS
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES
RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the applicants to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal
REASONS GIVEN:
1. This determination concerns an application brought by Michael Quinn and Brigid Quinn, the defendants/applicants, who bring this application in person, and who are referred to as “the applicants”. The applicants bring this application under Article 34.5.3° of the Constitution seeking leave to appeal to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 21st May, 2015.
2. Allied Irish Banks plc, the plaintiff/respondent, is referred to as “the respondent”.
3. In part four of the application form the applicants set out information about the decision that they seek to appeal as follows:-
4. The applicants set out in great detail in part five of the application form a chronology of “facts and opinions”. A booklet was provided with tabs referring to the paragraphs. Under the Scheme providing for this Court’s new jurisdiction, it is not anticipated that this degree of detail be provided on an application for leave to appeal. However, the Court has borne in mind that the applicants are bringing this application in person, that they believe that there has been a miscarriage of justice and that no determination can be made without the benefit of all the facts which they present.
5. The applicants have listed the reasons in law as to why the decision sought to be appealed involves a matter of general public importance and/or why in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court as:-
(i) It is a matter of public interest and concern that directors of a company can take on personal liabilities when entering into commitments on behalf of companies as directors. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal in finding that the defendants herein have taken on such commitments have breached the principle of separate corporate identity as established in Salomon –v- Salomon (1897).
(ii) It is also a matter of public interest and concern that the controversial device of remedial constructive trust can be used to give the Bank, in this case, full beneficial ownership of property where it was never the intention of either the Bank, the company or the defendants that they be given such ownership where the lands in question were only to be given as security for the loans to the company with the normal equity of redemption.
6. The applicants seek, should the leave to appeal be granted and appeal successful, that the decision of the Court of Appeal be reversed and the decision of the High Court be set aside.
7. The applicants are not asking the Supreme Court to depart from one of its own decisions or to make a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
8. The respondent opposes the application for leave to appeal. The respondent filed its response late, and out of time. This is both a breach of the Rules and a discourtesy to the Court. This is a factor which could have an implication on the issue of costs.
9. The respondent takes issue with points i) and ii) made by the applicants in part four of the application for leave to appeal, and states that both points appear to be submissions of law not fact.
10. The respondent opposes the application for leave to appeal for the following reasons:-
(i) The decision in respect of which leave to appeal is sought does not involve a matter of general public importance. The proceedings concerned the application of well-established principles to the facts as found by the trial judge. No novel legal issue was considered or determined by the Court below.
(ii) It is not, in the interests of justice, necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court. To allow this appeal would be to ignore the established criteria applied by the Supreme Court in determining the circumstances in which appeals might be allowed.
11. Article 34 of the Constitution provides for the public administration of justice; describes the courts established by the Constitution, and those which may be established by law; provides for the full and original jurisdiction of the High Court; establishes the Court of Appeal under Article 34.2; and sets out its appellate jurisdiction under Article 34.4.1°. This reads:
“1° The Court of Appeal shall—
i save as otherwise provided by this Article, and
ii with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law,
have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court, and shall also have appellate jurisdiction from such decisions of other courts as may be prescribed by law.”
12. Article 34.4.3° of the Constitution also provides for the finality of decisions of the Court of Appeal, save for appeals that may be taken to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Court of Appeal. Article 34.5.4° concerns appeals where a litigant seeks to come directly from the High Court to the Supreme Court. The article relevant to this appeal, where the Court of Appeal has already given judgment on a matter, is Article 34.4.3°.
“3° The Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the Court of Appeal if the Supreme Court is satisfied that—
i the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or
ii in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court.”
13. The decision of the Supreme Court under Article 34.5.6° is in all cases “final and conclusive.”
14. Primarily, this Court is now “subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law”, an appellate jurisdiction from the Court of Appeal. Such an appeal may only be exercised provided that this Court is satisfied either that the relevant decision of the Court of Appeal “involves a matter of general public importance” or, alternatively, that it is, “in the interests of justice”, necessary that there be an appeal to this Court. The constitutional framework established by the 33rd Amendment of the Constitution thus requires, in order for a party to be entitled to appeal to this Court from a decision of the Court of Appeal, that it be demonstrated that either “a matter of general public importance” arises, or that “in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal” to this Court. The statutory framework for the exercise of the right to apply to this Court for such leave is to be found in the Court of Appeal Act, 2014, and in particular the provisions of s. 44 of that Act, which inserts a new s. 7 into the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961. The Rules of Court are set out in the amended Order 58 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
15. The Constitution has retained the entitlement of one appeal as of right from the High Court, subject to express exclusions or regulation by statute from the High Court to the Court of Appeal. What is sought here is a second appeal. The jurisdiction to bring an appeal to this Court is confined principally to cases where, as a result of the determination of the Court of Appeal, the decision of that court is such that the issues raised on a proposed appeal would involve a matter of general public importance or would be such that it is in the interests of justice that there be a further appeal to this Court.
16. In this case the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal on the 21st May, 2015, the order being perfected on the 22nd May, 2015.
17. The Court of Appeal delivered an ex tempore judgment on the 21st May, 2015. The judgment was delivered by Ryan P., Kelly and Sheehan JJ. concurring. The Court of Appeal expressed its sympathy for the applicants, stating:-
“The [respondent’s] claim was for a declaration that there was an equitable mortgage in respect of the missing plots, and in the alternative, that those lands were held by the [applicants] subject to a constructive trust in favour of the [respondent]. That was the subject of the judgment of the High Court and the subsequent declarations that were made in consequence.
The trial judge held in favour of the [respondent] on both counts. The [applicants] appealed. They represented themselves at the hearing of the appeal but they were legally represented by a full team of lawyers in the High Court. Ms. Quinn read a prepared statement and Mr. Quinn made oral submissions.
The Quinns presented as hard-working decent people who were extremely unfortunate. The Court was impressed with their account of what went wrong with their business. Mr. Quinn insisted that theirs was not a story of overweening ambition or extravagant greed, but of a business that depended on access and which struggled to survive two long periods of roadworks. At the same time, Mr. and Mrs. Quinn feel that the [respondent] should have been more understanding and acted precipitately and unreasonably. Even when it had instituted proceedings and there was an opportunity for alternative dispute resolution, the [respondent] did not cooperate according to the Quinns.
The Court is sympathetic to the plight of the [applicants]. Obviously, we are not in a position to comment, still less to do anything about the reasons put forward by Mr. and Mrs. Quinn for why things went so wrong. This Court does not know and cannot comment on whether the [applicants] are correct in what they say about the roadworks or about the [respondent’s] attitude. It is important that we should make clear that we are not saying anything about those things because they are not before us and we know nothing about them. That does not stop us expressing our sense of understanding and sympathy that the Quinns should feel as they do.
As to the appeal, unfortunately, nothing that Mr. or Mrs. Quinn have said has demonstrated where the trial judge might have gone wrong in his judgment in the facts that he found or in the law that he applied. It is clear to the Court that the judge gave careful consideration to all the issues in the case in respect of facts and law. We do not find any error in the judgment.”
18. The Court of Appeal referred to the summary of the conclusion of the trial judge as follows:-
“
(a) there was clear agreement by both the company and the [applicants] to create a mortgage over Plots A, B and C and not just Plot A;
(b) the judge rejected the evidence of the [applicants] to the contrary;
(c) the documentary evidence led to the same conclusion, that there was an express agreement, both oral and set out in the documents, to create a charge over the 40,000 ft.² supermarket development and the land on which it was located, such documents being or including–
(i) the letter of sanction dated 3rd May 2006;
(ii) the letter of 28th April 2007 from Marsh Mackey & Company, Chartered Accountants, acting on behalf of the company and the [applicants];
(iii) documents submitted in support of the application for the loan;
(iv) letter of undertaking from the solicitors.
(d) The concluded agreement to create a legal mortgage gave rise to the creation and existence of an equitable mortgage.
The judge also found that notwithstanding the absence of a fiduciary relationship a constructive trust could and did arise on the facts of the case.”
19. The Court of Appeal considered submissions of the applicants, which are set out and addressed in the judgment. For example, as set out in paragraph 28(b) of the judgment of the Court of Appeal:-
“
(b) The trial judge failed to respect the legal distinction between the company in its separate personality from the shareholders, directors and management. The judge held that the directors became personally liable for the company’s obligations and that clearly offended, according to the submission, the rule in Salomon v. Salomon (1897). This is not a correct understanding of the judgment. At paragraph 5.10, the trial judge considers the issue of incorporation and the role of the [applicants] and the principle that the courts will not permit incorporation to be used for fraudulent, illegal or improper purposes. That was the submission made on behalf of the [respondent]. On the facts of the case, the judge repeated his conclusion that the Quinns and the company agreed: ‘there was a simultaneous agreement by the company through the directors and the [applicants] acting in their personal capacity to ensure that the company was in a position to provide the security that it promised to the [respondent]’”.
20. This Court is also sympathetic to the plight of the applicants. However, this Court is not a Court of fact finding, or correcting errors if there be any errors. The Court in considering the extensive documentation provided in fact sees no errors of law.
21. The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the terms of Article 34.5.3° of the Constitution, quoted above. Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeal must involve a matter of general public importance, or it must be necessary in the interests of justice that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court, before this Court has jurisdiction.
22. The Court is not satisfied that the decision of the Court of Appeal raises either a matter of general public importance or that it is necessary in the interests of justice that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court. Facts were found and law was applied by the trial judge, and the decision of the trial judge was appealed to the Court of Appeal. The law as to equitable mortgages and constructive trusts are well established concepts in law.
23. Consequently, on neither of the grounds set out in Article 34.5.3° does this Court have jurisdiction under the Constitution to grant leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal. It follows that the applicants are not entitled to a further appeal.
And it is hereby so ordered accordingly.
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