Supporting Documents:
 
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION JOHN ROONEY PLAINTIFF / APPLICANT AND
IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DEFENDANTS / RESPONENTS
APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPLY FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.4° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES
RESULT: The Court refuses leave to extend time within which to appeal to this Court directly from the High Court.
REASONS GIVEN:
1. This is an application by John Rooney, the plaintiff/appellant, referred to as “the appellant”, in relation to a judgment of the High Court (Feeney J.) delivered on the 4th July, 2013. Ireland and the Attorney General, the defendants/respondents, are referred to as “the respondents”.
2. The appellant has applied seeking (i) an extension of time for leave to appeal, and (ii) leave to appeal from the decision of the High Court of the 4th July, 2013.
On the 4th July, 2013, the High Court, on a motion brought on behalf of the respondents, ordered that pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court the appellant’s proceedings in this action be dismissed on the grounds that they disclose no reasonable cause of action, are frivolous and vexatious, and constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. It was further ordered that the appellant be at liberty to take up the transcript of the Digital Audio Recording from these High Court proceedings heard before Feeney J. on the 3rd July, 2013.
3. In giving his decision, the learned High Court judge referred to the Rooney No. 1 case, Rooney v. Minister for Agriculture [1991] 2 I.R. 539, and to the Rooney No. 2 case, (unreported, Finnegan J., delivered on 18th November, 2010), to set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court. The appellant sought, and failed, to set aside the Supreme Court judgments in Rooney No. 1 and Rooney No. 2 on the grounds that those judgments failed to address the issue which he claimed was the repugnancy of reactor grants to Article 15.2.1º of the Constitution. These judgments remain.
In the case before Feeney J. the appellant’s claim was the issue of:-
“…
the repugnancy of reactor grants to Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution. He also in the declarations proceeds on the basis that the so-called real questions did not merge in the 1987 or 1995 proceedings and that those decisions in both cases are therefore not binding or final.
The factual background to both Rooney No. 1 and Rooney No. 2 are identical. There is no additional fact or factual error identified in relation to those two cases and the claims made by [the appellant] solely relate to legal matters flowing from undisputed facts. There is no claim of fraud or that the Supreme Court in either case proceedings on the basis of incorrect facts as the claim is that the Court did not address the real question which is in fact a question of law.
The source of the dispute between [the appellant] and the Department of Agriculture goes back to 1984, some 29 years ago. At that time reactor cattle, that is cattle suffering from TB, were identified and removed from [the appellant’s] herd. [The appellant] received an offer of compensation for his herd and he claimed that his rights were not adequately protected by an administrative not statutory scheme which provided for ex-gratia payment of compensation. [The appellant] claimed that the compensation payable to him should have been expressly provided for in a statutory scheme. He claimed that such scheme was mandated under European Union law. [The appellant] refers to these issues and other related issues in paragraphs 6 to 13 inclusive of the statement of claim in this case. These issues which [the appellant] characterises in his statement of claim as being the real issues in controversy were the subject of two previous High Court proceedings commenced by [the appellant] in 1987 and in 1995. Both were heard and determined by the High Court and subsequently by the Supreme Court on appeal.”
The High Court held:-
“In the light of the two Supreme Court judgments and the order in the 1995 proceedings of the Supreme Court of the 18th November 2010 dismissing the appeal, all substantive issues arising from the 1987 and the 1995 proceedings have been dealt with in the High Court and subsequently conclusively by the High Court. (sic) I am satisfied there is no basis for suggesting that there are real questions in controversy in relation to either the 1987 or 1995 proceedings which remain to be determined. I am bound by the judgments of the Supreme Court. I cannot reopen or permit to be reventilated the same claims under any guise. The [appellant] is not entitled to revisit, re-argue or reformulate in these proceedings issues or matters which have been determined in the 1987 and 1995 proceedings. His claims have been dismissed. He made claims based upon certain alleged legal wrongs. Those claims were dismissed. After losing those claims this Court cannot permit [the appellant] to reformulate his claim as his claim has been conclusively and finally dealt with by the Supreme Court judgments.”
4. The High Court referred to the appellant’s claim as to the conduct of the judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court. Similar claims are made against the professionals who represented the respondent. He also sought to impugn the registration of the costs order and the Isaac Wunder order. Having considered the facts and the law in Order 19 r. 28, and the law on vexatious proceedings, the High Court held:-
“To permit a continuation of these proceedings would be to cause an injustice to the [respondents] and would amount to an abuse of process. The proceedings have been brought for the improper purpose of seeking to avoid and delay the recovery of costs already finally and conclusively ordered.”
5. The High Court pointed out that the appellant has made his claim and that it had been conclusively determined by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the High Court stated that it would dismiss the appellant’s claim, and ordered that the appellant pay costs to the respondents when taxed in default of agreement. The High Court made arrangements to provide the DAR of the judgment to the appellant in the middle of the following week.
6. The grounds filed on behalf of the appellant for an extension of time to appeal from the High Court were as follows:-
“(i) Plaintiff/Appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal the Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Feeney and, this intention was communicated to the Office of the Chief State Solicitor by emails of the 24th July 2013;
(ii) Personal circumstances including illness of Plaintiff/Appellant’s mother and Plaintiff/Appellant contributed to the delayed had from the 24th July 2013 in bringing the application for an enlargement of the time for appealing the Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Feeney.
(iii) There are arguable grounds of Appeal:
Permitting an enlargement of time within which to appeal the Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Feeney sits well with the spirit of Bunreacht Na hEireann in permitting the issue of the civil miscarriage of justice (arising out of the failure from practically 1987 to the present time of Plaintiff/Appellant’s litigation to engage the issues of the repugnancy of non-statutory reactor grants to Article 15.2.1 of Bunreacht Na HEireann and the invalid transposition of Council Directives 77/391/EEC and 78/52/EEC into Irish law) to be confronted and fairly addressed by the Supreme Court.”
7. The respondent opposed the application for an extension of time within which to appeal on the following grounds:-
“The Appellant in the circumstances is not entitled to prosecute his Appeal or to obtain an extension of time to do so where the Appellant has failed to appeal within the time prescribed under the Rules of the Superior Courts, the Appellant having also failed to explain or seek to excuse why he did not do so. The Appellant has been guilty of inordinate and inexcusable delay in making the Application now before the Court.
The Appellant has also failed to establish any good reason why he did not proceed with an appeal within the time prescribed under the Rules of the Superior Courts.
The Respondent also opposes the extension of time sought by the Appellant to appeal against the Judgment and the Order of the learned Judge of the 4th July 2013 in circumstances where the Appellant has failed to comply with the principles according to which an Appellant is entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court against a Judgment and Order of the High Court.”
8. The first issue for the Court is whether the appellant is entitled to an order extending the time within which to bring his appeal.
9. The application of the appellant was received in the office of the Supreme Court on the 24th April, 2015. The order he seeks to appeal was made on the 4th July, 2013, and perfected on the 5th July, 2013.
10. The Court finds that there is no satisfactory exposition of an intention of the appellant to appeal the order of Feeney J. within the required time. The appellant has not advanced any evidence that he formed the intent to appeal within the time permitted.
11. Further, there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay, from the Summer of 2013 to 24th April, 2015, in bringing the application for an extension of time.
12. The appellant has failed to show any mistake or other reasonable excuse for his delay.
13. Further, the appellant has not shown any arguable ground of appeal, either in the reasons stated on the form as to why the Court should grant leave to appeal, or on the grounds which would be relied on if leave to appeal were granted.
14. Further, the Court finds no reasonable basis for appeals Nos. 111/1990 and 430/2010, to be linked to this appeal.
15. In all the circumstances, the Court refuses leave to extend time within which to bring this appeal.
And It is hereby so ordered accordingly.
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