BETWEEN

3. Mr. Farrell counters that if the decision was significant, there was no uncertainty in the legislation; that this was not public interest litigation; that the case raised no point of law of conspicuous novelty; and that different rules apply to applications under the teaching Council Acts.

4. I think that Mr. Farrell is right. This was an action brought exclusively to advance the plaintiff’s personal interest. It did raise an issue of statutory interpretation, which was whether a scheduled organisation is precluded from making a notification to the National Vetting Bureau under s. 19 of the Act of 2012 unless it does so as soon as may be, but the essence of the case was that the defendant was actuated by malice and was acting mala fides. The plaintiff lost. I see no reason to depart from the ordinary rule that costs follow the event.

5. There will be an order for taxation of the defendant’s costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs and the costs of discovery, and for payment by the plaintiff of those costs when so taxed and ascertained.

7. The action was commenced by plenary summons issued on 16th July, 2018. The plaintiff moved immediately for an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant from making the proposed notification, and this was granted on the plaintiff’s undertaking that he would not, pending the trial of action, carry on any activities for which a vetting disclosure would be required.

8. In the ordinary way, the interlocutory injunction would lapse on the disposal of the substantive action. In this case, the plaintiff wishes to appeal and asks that notwithstanding the view that I have taken of the claim, I should continue the injunction (on the plaintiff’s continued undertaking) pending the hearing of any appeal or, at least, until the first directions hearing before the Court of Appeal.

9. Ms. Bolger, for the plaintiff, argues that the claim concerned an untested area of law, both as far as the Teaching Council and the National Vetting Bureau are concerned. It is said that if the proposed notification is made, there will be a significant impact on the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, which may be very difficult to undo, if his appeal were to succeed.

10. Mr. Farrell, for the defendant, does not contest the jurisdiction of this court to further restrain the making of a notification pending any appeal by the plaintiff. He recalled that the defendant’s position on the interlocutory application in July 2018, was that s. 19 of the Act of 2012, makes it a criminal offence not to make a notification once a bona fide concern has been formed, so that the defendant could not give an undertaking. This remained the defendant’s position. In my view, the position taken by the defendant was correct in July 2018 and it is correct now.

11. The jurisdiction of the High Court to make an order of the nature now sought is well established. In L.C. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2016] IESC 36 the Supreme Court held that it has jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction pending appeal. The decision of the Supreme Court in Okunade v. Minister for Justice [2012] 3 I.R. 152 makes it clear that the High Court, also, has jurisdiction to grant an injunction pending appeal, where this is shown to be necessary in the interests of justice.

12. Okunade was an appeal to the Supreme Court against the refusal of the High Court to restrain the deportation of the applicants pending the hearing of their application for leave to seek judicial review of a refusal of subsidiary protection, and a decision to deport. Prior to the appeal, the applicants’ leave application was refused by the High Court but the Supreme Court nevertheless heard the appeal against the refusal of the injunction. Clarke J. (as he then was) delivered a judgment with which Denham C.J., Hardiman, Fennelly and O’Donnell JJ. agreed.

13. At para. 57, Clarke J. said:-

“…it seems to me that the distinction between a stay where certiorari or prohibition is sought and an injunction in other cases is not based on an intention that different criteria apply to the grant of, on the one hand, a stay and, on the other hand, an injunction. Rather the reason for the distinction is that there is a difference in substance between a stay and an injunction.”

“…It does not seem to me that the task of balancing those legitimate competing interests is different dependent on whether the measure sought to be challenged is said to be one which should be quashed by certiorari or prohibited, on the one hand, or whether an injunction is considered the appropriate means of intervening, on the other. Nor is it the case that the mere fact that there may be a measure in place which can be ‘stayed’ should alter that balance in comparison with a case where the most effective means of preserving the position pending trial may be to consider the grant of an injunction. The underlying requirements of justice are not dependent on the form of judicial review order ultimately sought or the form of temporary order applied for…

That, of course, leads to the question of what the appropriate criteria are or, put another way, what the test is for the grant of a stay or injunction which has the effect of preventing an otherwise valid measure or order from having effect pending trial.”

16. At para. 67 of Okunade Clarke J. said:-

“…Indeed, although it is unnecessary to go into detail for the purposes of this case, it seems to me that a like general principle underlies the approach of the court in many other types of cases where the same broad problem arises. In many situations it is necessary to decide what is to happen in the intervening period pending a trial or other determination (or indeed an appeal) when, by definition, it is not possible to decide what the ultimate outcome will be. All such cases involve the risk that, when the dust has settled, it will be seen that some person or body has suffered either by the intervention of the court or, equally, by its non-intervention.”

18. It is long and well established that the overriding consideration in deciding whether to grant a stay is to maintain a balance, so that justice will not be denied to either party. The same overriding consideration applies to a case in which an injunction pending appeal is sought.

19. In Star Elm Frames Limited v. Fitzpatrick [2016] IECA 234, Ryan P. said that the balance to be struck is between the entitlement of the unsuccessful party to appeal, and the right of the successful party to the benefit of the judgment obtained. Ryan P. identified the objective as being:- “…to preserve the right of appeal in the sense of maintaining the status quo as far as possible so that if the appellant succeeds his victory will be practically meaningful. And vice versa.”

20. In the course of this application, an issue arose as to whether the threshold to be met by an applicant for an injunction pending appeal might be higher than that applicable on an application for an interlocutory injunction pending trial or, perhaps, whether on such an application the court should engage in an assessment of the strength of the case. The answer to the first question is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in C.C. v. Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2016] IESC 48. In that case, Clarke J. saw no basis for applying a different principle or test to an application for a stay or injunction pending appeal, and an application for an interlocutory order pending trial. Clarke J., however, did acknowledge that legal and factual issues can fall away at trial as a result of findings of fact or developments or clarifications that occur during the course of the trial. So, while the test is whether there are bona fide or arguable grounds of appeal, the application of that test may be focussed by the judgment of the High Court.

21. The preponderance of authority suggests that the High Court, on an application such as this, at least in the majority of cases, should not go beyond assessing whether there is an arguable ground of appeal, to attempt to assess the strength or weakness of the appeal.

22. It is worth recalling that in Éire Continental Trading Co. Ltd. v. Clonmel Foods Ltd. [1955] I.R. 170 the Supreme Court held that one of the principles to be applied on an application for a late appeal is that the applicant must establish that an arguable ground exists. It seems to me that the same test is applicable on an application such as this.

23. In Redmond v. Ireland [1992] 2 I.R. 362, the Supreme Court said that one of the factors to be taken into account on an application for a stay is that a heavy responsibility lies upon the legal advisors of those seeking a stay of execution to assist the court on the reality of the appeal on liability.

24. Drawing the strands together, it seems to me that this application is not to be approached as an application for the continuation of the interlocutory injunction granted pending the trial of the action, but rather as a new application which takes into account how the case unfolded at trial. The initial test to be applied at this stage is whether there is a bona fide ground or grounds for appeal.

25. Applying the Campus Oil test as formulated by McCracken J. in B. & S. Ltd. v. Irish Auto Trader Ltd. [1995] 2 I.R. 142, the first step is to establish whether the party seeking the injunction has shown that there is a fair or bona fide or serious question to be tried. This formulation, recalled with approval in Okunade, puts the onus of proof on the party seeking the injunction, in this case the plaintiff.

26. On this application counsel emphasised the potential impact of the judgment on the plaintiff’s legal and constitutional rights but did not articulate what the ground or grounds of appeal might be.

27. The plaintiff’s case at this stage is very different to what it was at the time of the application for the interlocutory injunction pending trial. The several claims in the summons and statement of claim, other than the claim for a permanent injunction and damages for misfeasance in public office, were either abandoned or not pursued.

28. In the course of the trial of this action, a number of issues fell away. The first was whether a bona fide concern that a person might harm etc. a child or vulnerable person had to be based on a finding or allegation that the person had previously harmed etc. a child or vulnerable person. It was conceded that the relevant bona fide concern might arise from a finding or allegation of harm to a person other than a child or vulnerable person. The second was whether a bona fide concern might arise on the basis of untried and untested allegations. Unsurprisingly, it was conceded that it could. The third was the allegation that the decision of the disciplinary panel had been intentionally or maliciously sent to someone other than the plaintiff. At the trial it was acknowledged that this had been a mistake. The fourth was the allegation that the defendant had maliciously informed the plaintiff’s employer in China of the outcome of the disciplinary inquiry: which it had not. The fifth was the allegation that the defendant did not comply with the “Personal Data Security Breach Code of Practice”, which was not pursued.

29. There were, in the end, two strands to the plaintiff’s case. The first was delay, and the second was malice. It must be recalled that it was never part of the plaintiff’s case that there was no objective basis for a bona fide concern.

30. The first strand was delay. For the reasons given, I concluded that there was no delay on the part of the defendant, but I am content to take the view for present purposes that the plaintiff may be able to formulate an arguable ground of appeal that I was wrong in that conclusion: perhaps because the defendant ought to have been in a position to make the necessary assessment immediately or soon after the disciplinary inquiry had concluded.

31. Success on such a ground, however, would not avail the plaintiff. It seems to me that the core issue, if any appeal is to succeed, is not whether the defendant delayed but whether the consequence of any delay in making a notification is to absolve the defendant of its statutory obligation, and to deprive the defendant of its power, to notify a bona fide concern. In my view, the “use it or lose it” argument is untenable. I do not consider that this is an issue which can fairly be said to require “detailed argument and mature consideration”.

32. The second strand, the allegation of malice, boiled down to an argument that the defendant’s Evidence of Character Panel maliciously set out to destroy the plaintiff’s reputation, out of spite that the disciplinary inquiry into the most serious allegations against the plaintiff had collapsed. This argument ignores the objective evidence and the fact that the members of the defendant who made up the Evidence of Character Panel had nothing whatsoever to do with the disciplinary inquiry. I saw no conceivable basis for the claim of misfeasance in public office, and I cannot imagine that the Court of Appeal could take any other view. In my view, there was never a bona fide issue to be tried that the defendant was guilty of misfeasance in public office. If I am wrong in that, there was not a shred of evidence produced in support of that case. In either case, it seems to me that there can be no good arguable ground of appeal.

33. The plaintiff has not articulated, nor have I been able to discern, any arguable ground of appeal.

34. Against the inevitability that this will go further, I think that I should express my view on the balance of convenience.

35. Absent an injunction, the defendant will make the notification it has concluded it must make. The defendant argues that unless and until an application is made for a vetting disclosure, the information will be inert. But, as Mr. Farrell put it in the course of the trial, it will be inert, like nuclear waste. Perhaps contained is a better word. If the report is made, the plaintiff will have all of the statutory protections put in place by the Act of 2012, but it seems to me that he can reasonably apprehend a risk that when all of those procedures and safeguards have been exhausted, the decision might be that the information is “specified information” and that its disclosure might be necessary and proportionate. Such a disclosure might very well damage his employment prospects.

36. Prima facie the defendant has a statutory obligation to make a notification and has a legitimate interest in complying promptly with that obligation. The reporting obligation in s. 19 is a critical part of a statutory scheme for the protection of children and vulnerable persons and there is a public interest in not undermining that scheme.

37. As against that, the plaintiff is willing to undertake that he will not, pending the outcome of his appeal, engage in any activities for which a vetting disclosure might be required. If he were to do that (and no doubt has been expressed that he would not abide such an undertaking) I think that it could fairly be said that the database would not be compromised by the fact that it would not have a record of the defendant’s concern. If the plaintiff’s appeal were to be upheld, it would be difficult and cumbersome to expunge any notification from the National Vetting Bureau database.

38. I think that it must be said that, in principle, the making of a notification that ought not be made would be an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights. Put another way, the plaintiff has a right to expect that the database should not include information concerning him which should not be on the database.

39. The injustice to the defendant if the plaintiff’s appeal were to fail would be that its entitlement to comply with its statutory obligations would be postponed. The injustice to the plaintiff if his appeal were to succeed would be that he would be faced with the prospect of further litigation to seek to expunge the information, and of further delay in getting back to work as a teacher.

40. If the plaintiff had an arguable ground of appeal, my view would be that the making of the notification should be postponed pending the hearing of his appeal. On the stance that the defendant has (quite properly) taken, that postponement could only be by an injunction pending appeal, on the plaintiff’s undertaking in the terms offered.

41. Logically, if the plaintiff has no arguable ground of appeal, there should be no stay but I think that the plaintiff is entitled to the chance to persuade the Court of Appeal that I am wrong. Balancing the plaintiff’s right to an effective appeal against the limited postponement of the defendant’s right, I consider that the least risk of injustice is to further postpone the making of the notification until the first directions hearing before the Court of Appeal.