Judgment
Title: | Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Ennis |
Neutral Citation: | [2011] IESC 46 |
Supreme Court Record Number: | 201/07 |
District Court Record Number: | 2005 10871 |
Date of Delivery: | 12/06/2011 |
Court: | Supreme Court |
Composition of Court: | Murray J., Hardiman J., Macken J. |
Judgment by: | Hardiman J. |
Status: | Approved |
Result: | Questions answered in the negative |
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| Judgments by | Link to Judgment | Concurring | Hardiman J. | | Murray J., Macken J. | |
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[2011] IESC 46
THE SUPREME COURT
201/2007
Murray J
Hardiman J.
Macken J.IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 16 OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT, 1947
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (AT THE SUIT OF GARDA ELAINE ROWAN)
Prosecutor
Accused
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Hardiman delivered the 6th day of December, 2011.
1. On a date in 2007, not unfortunately readily legible in the documentation before this Court, His Honour Judge Terence O’Sullivan stated a case for the opinion of this Court in relation to certain points of law which will be set out below.
2. Judge O’Sullivan was hearing appeals from the District Court and there came before him the appeal of the defendant, Frank Ennis, from his conviction on the 14th February, 2006, for an offence contrary to s.49 (4) and (6) (a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as inserted by s.10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 and as amended by s.23 of the Road Traffic Act, 2002.
3. In the Circuit Court, according to the case stated and signed by the learned Circuit Judge, the evidence on the hearing of the appeal followed the familiar pattern of evidence in breath/alcohol cases. That is to say, the evidence was not directed at establishing that the defendant was unfit to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle by reason of drunkenness, but rather that he did in fact drive a car in a public place “while there was present in [his] body a quantity of alcohol such that within three hours after so driving the concentration of alcohol in [his] breath exceeded a concentration of thirty-five micrograms per hundred millilitres of breath”.
4. Accordingly, the proofs required of the prosecution were: that the accused was driving a car in a public place at a particular time; that he had been lawfully arrested under a relevant section of the Road Traffic Acts, had been brought to a garda station; that a lawful demand to provide a specimen of his breath had been made of him pursuant to s.13 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994; that the specimen was duly taken from him within the relevant time; and that the machine used to take the specimen had produced a “duly completed statement” taken in accordance with the Road Traffic Act, 1994 (s.17) Regulations, 1999 and that this “duly completed statement” indicates a concentration of alcohol in the breath greater than the permitted level. Proof of this latter matter may be adduced by means of a “statement” by virtue of the provisions of s.21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994. It is convenient to set out the provisions of s.21(1) at this stage:
“A duly completed statement purporting to have been supplied under s.17 shall, until the contrary is shown, be sufficient evidence in any proceedings under the Road Traffic Acts 1961-1994, of the facts stated therein, without proof of any signature on it or that the signatory was the proper person to sign it, and shall, until the contrary is shown, be sufficient evidence of compliance by the Member of the Garda Síochána concerned with the requirements imposed on him by or under this part prior to and in connection with the supply by him pursuant to s.17(2) of such statement.” (Emphasis added)
5. The effect of this is that the concentration of alcohol in the defendant’s breath may be proved by a “duly completed statement” produced by the machine which conducts the analysis and permits the inputting of information in any particular case by a member of the gardaí. The subsection just quoted also provides a presumption in favour of the prosecution in relation to the due performance of the obligations of a member of An Garda Síochána in relation to the taking of an evidential breath specimen.
6. Those obligations are contained in the Regulations referred to above, statutory instrument 326 of 1999, and will be, so far as relevant, set out below. The significance of compliance with these regulations is that it is only “a duly completed statement” which has the evidential effect mentioned in the subsection. This ability to prove the central fact of the case by certificate is a statutory innovation which greatly favours the prosecution.
7. For present purposes the relevant parts of the Regulations mentioned are Articles 4 and 5 which provide as follows:
8. There are four things which require to be noted about Regulation 5:
“(a) It requires a garda to input the Section of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 which it is alleged ‘the person contravened’ into the analysing machine.
(b) The garda who is to do this is ‘the member of the Garda Siochána who required the arrested person to provide two specimens of breath’.
(c) The inputting is to be done ‘prior to the provisions of the specimens’ i.e. between the requirement and compliance with it and
(d) The inputting of the information mentioned, and certain other information, is to be done ‘for the purpose of completing the statements’.”
Relevant facts.
9. Only certain of the facts set out in the case stated are relevant and need be recapitulated here. There was evidence that, on the relevant date, the defendant had been accosted by a member of the Garda Síochána while he was driving a car in a public place in Terenure, Dublin. As a result of observations made by the guard the defendant was arrested. In relation to this arrest the learned Circuit Judge found as follows:
“I was not satisfied that at the time of the arrest Garda Rowan specifically said to the accused ‘I am arresting you under s.49(8) of the Road Traffic Act’. I was satisfied that it was her intention to rely upon the powers given to her under s.49(8) of the Road Traffic Act to effect an arrest but she did not in fact invoke the statute at the time of the arrest.”
10. There was further uncontested evidence that the defendant was brought to a garda station where another guard subsequently made a demand of him for the production of a specimen of breath. This was done pursuant to the power conferred by s.13 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 which provides as follows:
“(1) Where a person is arrested under s.49(8) or 50(10) of the principal Act or s.12(3), or where a person is arrested under s.53(6), 106(3A) or s.112(6) of the principal Act and a member of the Garda Síochána is of opinion that the person has consumed an intoxicant, a member of the Garda Síochána may, at a Garda Station, at his discretion, through either or both of the following -
(a) Require the person to provide, by exhaling into an apparatus for the purpose of determining the concentration of alcohol in the breath, two specimens of his breath, and may indicate the manner in which he is to comply with the requirement,
(b) [irrelevant]
11. It thus appears that the power to demand an evidential breath specimen depends on the person of whom the demand is made having been arrested under a specific Section, and not otherwise.
12. There was evidence in the present case that the defendant provided the specimens as he was required by law to do. This was the evidence of a Garda Dooley who produced a s.17 statement in Court. This statement was the subject of objection by the defence with the result that, according to the case stated:
“A copy of this s.17 statement, the original of which was tendered but nor formally admitted into evidence by reason of the issues raised as to compliance with Article 5 of the 1999 Regulations, is attached at annex B…”.
13. The case stated also records that the defence cross-examined Garda Dooley by asking him whether the account he had given in evidence as to the procedures followed by him in connection with the taking of the specimens was a full and complete account of the procedures followed by the witness. He replied “yes”.
Questions posed by the trial Judge.
14. The learned Circuit Judge sought the opinion of this Court on the following questions:
(a) Where a member of An Garda Síochána has in mind arresting a person under s.49(8) of the Road Traffic Act and then arrests that person whilst explaining to the person that the arrest is for “drink driving” without however expressly invoking either the Section or the Act under which the person is being arrested, can such an arrest be lawful?
(b) In relation to Article 5 of the 1999 “Section 17 Regulations” (SI 326 of 1999) was I, as trial Judge, entitled to hold that the evidential burden resting on the accused by virtue of the provisions of s.21 of the 1994 Road Traffic Act, in relation to the issues of compliance with the said Regulations, was capable of being discharged by the combination of the direct evidence of Garda Dooley, his evidence in cross-examination, and the statutory presumptions.
(c) If the presumption under s.21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 is deemed to be rebutted, what is the effect of same on the status of the s.17 statement? (Emphasis in original)
The first question.
15. The first question appears to me, in its terms, to be governed by the decision in this Court in D.P.P. v. Mooney [1992] IR 548. In that case Blayney J. followed the well known English case of Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 as to the requirements for a valid arrest. I would also follow that case in its assertion of the general principle that a policeman arresting without a warrant “ must in ordinary circumstances inform the person arrested of the true grounds of arrest”.
16. That judgment went on to state:
“The requirement that he should be so informed does not mean the technical or precise language need be used. The matter is a matter of substance and turns on the elementary proposition that in this country a person is, prima facie, entitled to his freedom and is only required to submit to restraints on his freedom when he knows in substance the reason why it is claimed that the restraint should be imposed”.
17. Having cited the English case, Blayney J. continued:
“It is clear from the fourth of these propositions [that just quoted above] that a garda in making an arrest does not have to use technical or precise language. Provided the arrested person knows in substance why he is being arrested the arrest is valid. So telling the respondent that he was being arrested for an offence of drunk driving was a sufficient communication of the reason for his arrest since in my opinion it could mean any of the three offences under the Section. He told the respondent in substance why he was being arrested”.
18. The facts of that case, insofar as relevant, seem substantially similar to those of the present case. Accordingly I am bound to hold, and would in any event hold, that the arrest was a lawful arrest.
19. But in the prosecution in the District Court, and in the Circuit Court on appeal, the State required to prove not merely that the arrest was a lawful arrest, but also that the person of whom the requirement for a breath specimen was made, was a person arrested under one of the specified Sections set out in s.13(1). Whether this has been established is a matter which the learned trial judge may, if necessary, have to consider, and it is a different question to that raised in paragraph (a) of the case stated.
20. The authorities cited above establish that it is sufficient for a lawful arrest if the ground of the arrest is communicated in ordinary language. That is sufficient to dispose of the question as to the legality of the arrest. But if a statutory scheme positively requires that an arrest be under a specific Section or subsection, or one of a number of specific Sections, then it is manifest that proving the legality of the arrest may or may not involve proof that the arrest took place under one of the specified Sections.
21. The answer to the first question, accordingly, is “Yes”.
The second question.
22. In D.P.P. v. Kemmy [1980] IR 164 it was stated by O’Higgins C.J. that:
“Where a statute provides for a particular form of proof or evidence on compliance with certain provisions, in my view it is essential the precise statutory provisions be complied with. The Courts cannot accept something other than that which is laid down by the statute, or overlook the absence of what the statute requires. To do so would be to trespass into the legislative field. This applies to all statutory requirements; but it applies with greater general understanding to penal statutes which create particular offences and then provide a particular method for their proof”.
23. Whether or not it has been established that the provisions of a statute or statutory instrument have in fact been complied with is of course a matter for the learned trial judge. Normally, as in this case, the application to him in this regard will be made at the conclusion of the State’s evidence. The learned trial judge is of course entitled to consider all of that evidence, including anything which has transpired on cross-examination, or any part of the State’s evidence which may favour the defence. Equally, where there is an evidential burden resting on the defendant, he may discharge that burden by relying on any part of the State’s evidence which is favourable to him, or any answer or answers elicited in cross-examination.
24. I would also hold, following the decision of Lynch J. in O’Broinn v. Ruane [1989] ILRM 732, that a question in the very general form posed by counsel in this case is quite admissible, for the reasons given by Lynch J.
25. I would therefore answer the second question in the affirmative: any evidential burden resting on the accused is indeed capable of being discharged by a combination of the direct evidence of Garda Dooley, his evidence in cross-examination and any relevant statutory presumptions. Whether or not the State’s evidence generally, or any part of it does in fact discharge any evidential burden resting on the accused is of course a matter for the learned trial judge.
The third question.
26. I would answer the third question by saying that, if the presumption under s.21 is rebutted, then the s.17 statement will be without evidential effect as regards any statement of fact or matter to which the rebuttal applies.
27. I would therefore remit the case to the learned trial judge to be considered in accordance with the foregoing findings.