Judgment
Title: | Kennelly -v- Cronin |
Neutral Citation: | [2002] IESC 77 |
Supreme Court Record Number: | 341/01 |
Circuit Court Record Number: | 1999 No. 751A |
Date of Delivery: | 12/18/2002 |
Court: | Supreme Court |
Composition of Court: | McGuinness J., Geoghegan J., Fennelly J. |
Judgment by: | Fennelly J. |
Status: | Approved |
Result: | Questions answered |
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| Judgments by | Link to Judgment | McGuinness J. | | Geoghegan J. | | Fennelly J. | | |
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THE SUPREME COURT
Record No. 341/01
McGuinness J.
Geoghegan J.
Fennelly J.IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 16 OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT 1947
BETWEENSUPERINTENDENT ANTHONY KENNELLY
Applicant
and
MARK CRONIN, CATHERINE CRONIN, AND MARIE CRONIN
Respondents
JUDGMENT of FENNELLY J delivered on the 18th day of December 2002
For the sake of clarity, it is appropriate to explain exactly which parts of the other judgments being delivered today I agree with. Firstly, it is agreed that the first two questions in the Case Stated should be answered in the affirmative and the third in the negative.
I do not see any difference between the reasoning of McGuinness J and that of Geoghegan J with regard to the second question. I agree with both.
With regard to the answer to the third question, I agree with McGuinness J. In reality, the central point in the case is that the second and third named respondents were entitled to be heard before they could be bound anew by the re-entry of the charges. That is a point in common between the judgments of McGuinness and Geoghegan JJ. I would simply add that I believe that, in the ordinary way, an order of a District Judge can indeed be recalled and altered in the course of the sittings in the circumstances mentioned in the applicant’s submissions. That was not the problem here. It clearly could have been done, so long as the bails persons were permitted to be heard.