Supporting Documents:
99-17 AFL.pdf99-17 Rspndt Notce.pdf

BETWEEN

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

Result: The Court does not grant leave to appeal.

Reasons given:

1 It is well established that in order to obtain leave to appeal to this Court, it must be established that the decision sought to be appealed either involves a matter of general public importance or that it is otherwise in the interests of justice necessary that there should be an appeal.

2 The Court considers it desirable to repeat that a determination of the Court in an application for leave, while final and conclusive so far as the parties are concerned, is nevertheless a decision in relation to that application only. The issue is whether the questions raised, and the facts underpinning them, meet the constitutional criteria for leave. It will not, save in the rarest of circumstances, be appropriate to rely on a refusal of leave as having a precedential value in relation to the substantive issues in the context of a different case. Where leave is granted, any issue canvassed in the application will in due course be disposed of in the substantive decision of the Court.

3 Facts

In this case the applicant, a litigant in person, seeks leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal of the 4th of May 2017, dismissing his appeal against the decision of the then President of the High Court on the 9th of November 20154, itself dismissing an appeal against the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal on the 22nd of June 2015, which held that there was no prima facie case for inquiring into the conduct of the respondent solicitor.

4 The respondent solicitor had acted for a limited company, which the defendant in proceedings brought by a company McCool Controls and Engineering Limited, of which the plaintiff and applicant was the principal. The essential complaint made by the applicant against the respondent was that a motion had been issued in those proceedings which was listed to seek that the matter be adjourned for the purposes of mediation. The application was due to be heard in the last week of the summer term in 2012. It was listed for hearing but not reached, and eventually adjourned until the 31st of July. It is a matter of common knowledge that that week is particularly busy, and motions not reached are adjourned from day to day to attempt to ensure that they receive a hearing before the end of term. Here, the motion was ultimately listed and reached on the 31st of July 2012. Both parties were represented. The motion was refused, much to the disappointment of the applicant. He alleges however that the respondent’s solicitor was responsible for informing the plaintiff company’s lawyer, that the application would be heard at 2 o’clock. In fact the plaintiff was in court at 11 o’clock and the case was called. It is not clear whether the miscommunication was as a result of an error on the part of the solicitor, or a misunderstanding, or an error on some other person’s part. As Hogan J in the Court of Appeal has pointed out this type of confusion is not uncommon particularly towards the end of a busy term. In any event, the parties were contacted, the respondent’s solicitor correctly informed his colleague acting for the plaintiff company that the matter would be heard immediately, and as already set out, it proceeded with both sides represented. There is no evidence that any incorrect information communicated to the plaintiff company’s solicitor was deliberate, and it had absolutely no consequences adverse or otherwise. It is hardly surprising therefore that the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it did not appear that the facts did not disclose a prima facie case of misconduct, or that the appeal therefrom was dismissed by the President of the High Court and the Court of Appeal.

5 This Court is satisfied that this case does not disclose any point of law of general public importance, nor can it be said that the interests of justice require a further hearing of the complaint ventilated by Mr McCool. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal will be dismissed.

And It is hereby so ordered accordingly.